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The Divergent Effects of Diversity Ideologies for Race and Gender Relations 
Ashley E. Martin 
 Both practitioners and scholars have shown interest in initiatives that reduce bias and 
promote inclusion. Diversity ideologies—or beliefs and practices regarding how to approach 
group differences in diverse settings—have been studied as one set of strategies to promote racial 
equality, and argued to be effective for other intergroup relations, as well; however, little work 
has examined diversity ideologies in the context of gender, giving a limited understanding of 
their potential to improve gender relations. The present research compares the influence of two 
competing and commonly used ideologies—awareness and blindness—on race and gender 
relations. Awareness approaches recommend acknowledging and celebrating intergroup 
differences, whereas blindness approaches advocate for reducing and ignoring category 
membership. In contrast to research suggesting that race awareness is more effective at reducing 
racial bias than race blindness, I show that the opposite is true for gender. I theorize that 
awareness and blindness ideologies act upon unique types of race and gender differences in ways 
that preserve power for the dominant group, either exposing their opportunity-limiting nature 
(for race) or reifying their biological functionality (for gender). Using system justification theory, 
I show that diversity ideologies act upon distinct system-justifying rationales, where race 
awareness exposes differences in opportunities and experience, lessening denial of inequality, 
and thereby diminishing support for the status quo. In contrast, gender awareness highlights 
gender roles and their biological underpinnings, legitimizing gender differences in occupational 
segregation, and increasing support for the status quo (Studies 1–4). Additionally, I show that 
diversity ideologies have implications for unique forms of opportunity outcomes for women and
 racial minorities. For race, by increasing recognition of societal inequities, awareness leads 
Whites to show more support for policies that combat systemic inequality (i.e., affirmative 
action). For gender, by increasing biological attributions, awareness makes men more likely to 
stereotype in ways that limit women’s potential for success (Study 4). Finally, supporting my 
theory about the importance of the types of differences highlighted through awareness, I show 
that shifting the focus of differences toward external (opportunity, experience) ones leverages the 
benefits of awareness for both race and gender, providing a practical solution to improving race 
and gender equality (Studies 5–7). I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for 













  i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Tables and Figures ............................................................................................................... ii 
List of Appendices ......................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................................... iv 
Chapters 
Chapter 1: Introduction  ...................................................................................................................1 
Chapter 2: The System-Justifying Nature of Diversity Ideologies ..................................................4 
Study 1 ...............................................................................................................................19 
Study 2a .............................................................................................................................29 
Study 2b .............................................................................................................................30 
Study 3 ...............................................................................................................................32 
Chapter 3: The Consequences of Diversity Ideologies for Race and Gender Equality .................42 
Study 4 ...............................................................................................................................50 
Chapter 4: Shifting Attributions to Leverage Awareness Ideologies ............................................62 
Study 5 ...............................................................................................................................65 
Study 6 ...............................................................................................................................69 
Study 7 ...............................................................................................................................77 
Meta-Analysis Across Studies .......................................................................................................83 




Appendices ...................................................................................................................................129  
  ii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Correlations Between Race Awareness and Related Variables in Study 1 .....................96 
Table 2: Correlations Between Gender Awareness and Related Variables in Study 1 .................97 
Table 3: Correlations Between Variables in Study 3 .....................................................................98 
Table 4: Contrasts between Social Category and Ideology Conditions in Study 3 .......................98 
Table 5: Correlations Between Variables in Study 4 .....................................................................99 
Table 6: Contrasts Between Ideological Race Conditions for in Study 4 ......................................99 
Table 7: Awareness Endorsement on System Justification in Study 5 ........................................100 
Table 8: Correlation Table for Study 6 ........................................................................................101 
Table 9: Contrasts Between Social Category and Ideology Condition in Study 6 ......................101 
Table 10: Correlation Table for Study 7 ......................................................................................102 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Mediation Models for Study 1 ......................................................................................103 
Figure 2: Scatterplots for Race- and Gender- Awareness on System Justification in Study 2 ....104 
Figure 3: Graphs for Race and Gender Ideologies on Outcomes in Study 3 ...............................105 
Figure 4: Mediation Models for Study 3 ......................................................................................106 
Figure 5: Graphs for Race and Gender Ideologies on Outcomes in Study 4 ...............................107 
Figure 6: Mediation Models for Study 4 ......................................................................................108 
Figure 7: Graphs for Race and Gender Ideologies on Outcomes in Study 6 ...............................109 






  iii 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Scales Used Throughout Studies ............................................................................128 
Appendix B: Awareness and Blindness Reflection Manipulations  ............................................133 
Appendix C: Awareness and Blindness Article Manipulations ...................................................135 
Appendix D: Experience Awareness Email Prime ......................................................................140 
Appendix E: Experience Awareness and Blindness Article Manipulations ................................141 
 
  
  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 I am incredibly grateful to the mentors, friends, and family members who have supported 
me throughout this dissertation and over the course of my PhD. 
 First and foremost, thank you to my family. To my mother, for showing me how to be an 
“independent woman in the 21st century.” Thank you for empowering me and always being on 
my side. To my father, for being my rock; thank you for the unconditional love, support, and 
encouragement. I am so grateful to you both for cultivating my curiosity, prioritizing my 
education, and being my biggest advocates. Taylor, you have taught me the power of sisterhood. 
Thank you for helping me think both broadly and deeply and inspiring me in every way. I love 
you all so truly and deeply.  
Kathy, I cannot express, nor will I ever forget, the many ways you have shaped me and 
molded me into the scholar I am today. You have embodied the agency that not only inspires me 
to pursue my ideas, but that underlies every research idea I have ever had. I am a more confident 
and empowered individual, thoughtful and critical scholar, and theoretical and creative thinker, 
because of you. Thank you for always making me a priority and encouraging me to pursue my 
ideas, even when they were unclear and underdeveloped. This dissertation would not be possible 
without your unwavering support, constant encouragement, and especially your patience. You 
have been a fantastic advisor and role-model and I hope to be the kind of mentor to my graduate 
students that you have been to me.  
Thank you to the rest of my dissertation committee. Modupe, I am incredibly grateful for 
your mentorship, guidance, and friendship. You have given me countless time and endless 
support, helped me be more practical and thoughtful, and have made me more resilient, 
industrious, and discerning. I would be neither the scholar nor the person I am today without 
  v 
you. Adam, your fingerprints are all over this dissertation. Thank you for helping me think more 
precisely, theoretically, and critically. Your research has inspired much of mine and your 
mentorship has encouraged me to balance, prioritize, and pursue. I hope to be the type of 
collaborator and friend to you that you have been to me. I look forward to many more projects 
together. Mike Slepian, you have shown me the synergies between friendship and collaboration. 
Thank you for diving into Gendered Cognition with me. You have shaped the way I approach 
research, think about ideas, and write papers, in a very special way. Aaron, thank you for your 
critical eye, practical advice, and useful feedback. You were invaluable to this dissertation.  
Thank you to my collaborators, for teaching and mentoring me over the course of the last 
few years. A special thank you to Mike North, who has been an incredible mentor to me. Thank 
you for helping me think broadly about intersectionality and inspiring me to be a compassionate 
and supportive mentor to others. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the 
remaining members of the management department at Columbia Business School and the 
SINGO Lab. I am immensely grateful, not only for the knowledge and training I have received, 
but also for your feedback, advocacy, and support. 
 To my friends, I would not have made it through the PhD without you. To Shiri 
Melumad, thank you for being such a loving, caring, and supportive friend. I have learned so 
much—and have so much to learn—from you. I’m excited to keep “growing up” together. Jen 
Dyck-Sprout, you have changed my view of friendship, my compassion towards others, and my 
outlook on life. Thank you for being such a strong advocate and reliable support system. Ashli 
Carter and Alice Lee, thank you for your friendship, support, feedback, and insight. I am so 
lucky to have gone through this journey with you and proud of the community we curated and 
cultivated together. I will miss you both immensely. Jon Jachimowicz, Ting Zhang, and Rachel 
  vi 
Ruttan, you made the job market bearable. Thank you for showing me how to “expand the pie” 
and for being a constant source of support and advice. Sanaz Mobasseri—my scholarly soul 
sister— thank you for validating my thoughts, challenging my views, and enhancing my agency. 
To everyone I have not mentioned by name, know that I have not forgotten you. There are so 
many others for whom I am grateful and who hold a special place in my heart.   
 Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible without the incredible gender 
scholars on whose shoulders I stand. Thank you for paving the way. A special thank you to the 
late Sandra Bem, whose “lenses of gender,” not only changed my perspective on gender, but also 


























  1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
For most Americans, there looms a tension between their country’s ideological 
commitment to equality, and its reality, where women and racial minorities—amongst many 
other groups—are underrepresented in positions of power. Given the fundamental human needs 
to make sense of the world (Heider, 1958; Fiske & Taylor 1991) and to see society as fair, just, 
and legitimate (Jost, Kay, & Thorisdotter, 2009a; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; 
2009), how does one rectify this disconnect? To make sense of why certain groups hold power 
over others, one must first draw upon the intergroup differences that exist and understand the 
role they play in creating and maintaining inequality. Thus, the types of differences between 
groups upon which we focus, the importance we place on them, and the ways in which we 
discuss them, carry power and potential both to legitimize inequality and, alternatively, to change 
it.  
In this dissertation, I examine approaches to intergroup differences to understand their 
role in maintaining and disrupting intergroup inequality. Using diversity ideologies—or beliefs 
and practices regarding how to best approach group differences to foster intergroup inclusion—I 
contrast the effects of “blindness” and “awareness” ideologies for race and gender relations. 
Awareness ideologies recommend acknowledging and celebrating intergroup differences, 
whereas blindness ideologies advocate for reducing and ignoring category membership. I 
propose that the types of intergroup differences upon which we focus and the purpose for doing 
so differentially legitimize and disrupt the status quo, which carries consequences for racial 
minorities’ and women’s opportunities.  
In Chapter 1, I hypothesize that race blindness and gender awareness differentially 
support the status quo (i.e., the “system”), where being blind to race differences but aware of 
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gender differences both serve to maintain power and privilege for the dominant group. I further 
argue that these divergent effects on system justification are due to the different system-justifying 
rationales used to make sense of race and gender inequality. For race, being blind to racial 
differences supports the system by denying inequality and ignoring the limited opportunities and 
devaluing treatments racial minorities face, whereas for gender, being aware of differences 
supports the status quo by attributing gender inequality to men and women’s natural, functional, 
and essential differences in skills and abilities. Thus, I propose that awareness (for race) and 
blindness (for gender) differentially act upon the status quo, either lessening denial of inequality 
by exposing the limited opportunities racial minorities face or deemphasizing essential gender-
role differences that support occupational segregation (Studies 1–3).  
In Chapter 2, I outline the implications of awareness and blindness ideologies for 
different forms of intergroup inequality. For race, I show that awareness leads Whites to better 
recognize inequality, which in turn increases support for policies that support systemic change 
(i.e., affirmative action). For gender, I show that awareness exacerbates biological/essentialist 
beliefs and leads to more gender stereotyping; thus, by minimizing stereotypes that legitimize 
inequality, gender blindness carries the potential to increase women’s opportunities in domains 
of power (Study 4).  
After suggesting that it is the types of differences that drive the divergent effects of race 
and gender ideologies, in Chapter 3, I propose that shifting the types of differences upon which 
diversity ideologies intervene can produce similar outcomes for race and gender relations. By 
directing the types of differences out-group members focus on away from internal sources, and 
toward external sources, I argue that an awareness ideology can be utilized as an adaptive 
intervention for both race and gender relations. In both field and experimental settings, I 
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demonstrate the utility of this intervention for reducing system justification and increasing 
support for diversity policies (Studies 5–7). I conclude by suggesting that diversity science has 
overemphasized its focus on ideologies as a solution for intergroup bias and inclusion without 
addressing the underlying problem: the types of differences being highlighted and ignored and 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SYSTEM-JUSTIFYING NATURE OF DIVERSITY IDEOLOGIES 
Conceptualizing Ideologies 
 To understand the effects of diversity ideologies, it is important to first understand the 
basic structure and function of an ideology. Though many definitions of ideology exist (Jost, 
Frederico, & Napier, 2009b; McLellan, 1986), common to most is the notion that ideologies are 
(1) sets of beliefs and values that (2) are shared amongst groups of individuals, (3) provide 
mental models to organize information, interpret stimuli, and make sense of one’s social reality, 
and (4) offer prescriptions, specifying ways in which to organize environments to achieve proper 
structure and smooth functioning (Denzau & North, 2000; Erikson & Tedin, 2003; Jost et al., 
2009b). Ideologies are both explicit and implicit, making assumptions about human nature, 
historical events, current realities, and future possibilities; and specifying ways to achieve social, 
economic, and political ideals (Jost et al., 2009b; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; 2009). Ideologies have 
both a discursive (socially constructed) superstructure, representing their content, as well as a 
functional (motivational) substructure, representing the psychological needs and motives of an 
individual (Jost et al., 2009). Thus, people adopt ideologies which contain content (beliefs, 
values) that align with their psychological motivations to make sense of and rationalize current 
societal arrangements (or advocate for their alternatives; Jost et al., 2009b; Kay & Jost, 2005). 
Ideologies have been predominantly studied in the political sphere, examining the “left-
right” divide (and their related subcomponents), and comparing and contrasting liberal ideologies 
(those which reject inequality and advocate for social change) to conservative ideologies (those 
which resist social change and accept inequality; Erikson & Tedin, 2003; Jost et al., 2009a; 
2009b). Though similarly labeled as ideologies, diversity ideologies have been studied in a 
largely distinct and disconnected domain, rarely being discussed alongside the left-right divide.  
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Diversity ideologies represent a specific set of values, principles, and beliefs regarding 
how to interpret, understand, and approach group differences, and structure environments to best 
foster inclusion and harmony in diverse settings (Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Sasaki & 
Vorauer, 2013). Most research examining diversity ideologies has contrasted two approaches: 
“blindness” and “awareness.” Across the literature, many different definitions have been used,1 
but for the purpose of this dissertation, I define blindness as an approach to intergroup 
differences aimed at achieving equality by reducing, eliminating, and ignoring category 
memberships, transmitting a common identity and focusing on similarities, rather than 
differences. On the other hand, I define awareness as an approach to intergroup differences 
aimed at achieving equality by acknowledging, recognizing, and emphasizing intergroup 
differences, validating meaningful identities, and understanding how these differences inform 
each group’s unique experience.  
Unlike political ideologies, whereby one ideology has a clear preference for inequality, 
diversity ideologies are unique in that both blindness and awareness are ostensibly aimed at 
achieving equality and inclusion. Indeed, in the United States, diversity ideologies were 
developed as strategies to reduce prejudice against, promote justice for, and improve the social 
and economic climate for African Americans (Markus, Steele, & Steele, 2000; Ryan, Hunt, 
Weible, Peterson & Casas, 2007). Thus, educational, legal, and psychological research has 
predominantly focused on (Black-White) interracial relations (as do I). A colorblind (race-blind) 
                                                
1 Across the literature conceptualizations of blindness share a common intention of “de-emphasizing difference in 
favor of a common core” and awareness of “recognizing intergroup difference”; however, the meaning and purpose 
of de-emphasizing and emphasizing difference has been varied. Blindness approaches have been interpreted to mean 
assimilation (Plaut, Goren & Thomas, 2009), preference for homogeneity (Gündemir, Dovidio, Homan, & De Dreu, 
2016), emphasis on individuality (Wolsko, Park, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2000), and value in meritocracy (Apfelbaum, 
Stevens, & Raegans, 2016). Similarly, awareness has been interpreted to mean celebration of difference (Wolsko et 
al., 2000), identity safety (Markus et al., 2000), segregation (Hahn, Benchefsky, Park & Judd., 2015), or inclusion of 
difference (Apfelbaum et al., 2016). Although such construct development has provided a nuanced understanding of 
diversity ideologies, they make for difficult comparison and result in mixed findings. 
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approach was intended to follow America’s foundational commitment to equality and undermine 
“separate, but equal” racial segregation (Plaut, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2000), while a multicultural 
(race-aware) approach aimed to provide racial minorities with a true sense of their cultural 
heritage and recognize the challenges and experiences faced by those groups in a White-
dominated power structure (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Markus et al., 2000). Thus, while awareness 
and blindness ideologies represent two contrasting approaches to intergroup differences, 
important to note is that they are both aimed toward a common good: intergroup equality 
(Wolsko et al., 2000; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; but see Hahn et al., 
2015).2  
Past work has shown that under the right circumstances, awareness of racial differences 
can increase Whites’ engagement with, and inclusion of, racial minorities, showing promise for 
bias reduction and improved interracial relations (see Rattan & Ambady, 2013 and Sasaki & 
Vorauer, 2013 for review). Though studied on and developed for interracial relations, 
recommendations are often transposed onto other groups—namely women—where many 
espouse the merits of embracing gender differences and the unique perspectives, approaches, and 
opinions that men and women offer (Annis & Meron, 2014; Baron-Cohen, 2003; Krawcheck, 
2017). However, little research has examined the effects of diversity ideologies on gender 
relations, making it unclear whether awareness is equally effective for women. Indeed, some 
work has shown that an awareness approach to gender relations exacerbates stereotyping 
(Martin, Phillips & Sasaki, 2018), undermines women’s confidence (Martin & Phillips, 2017), 
                                                
2 The assumption that diversity ideologies are benevolent is important for the purpose of this dissertation. Unlike the 
positive effects found when race awareness is adopted by those with benevolent intentions and views, for those who 
hold strong dominance motivations, or conservative values, race awareness has been shown to represent a threat to 
group privilege and the social order (the status quo) and exacerbate prejudices toward minorities (Correll, Park, & 
Smith, 2008; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).  
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and relates to certain biases that limit women’s opportunities (Koenig & Richeson, 2010).  
Given this disconnect between awareness ideologies for race and gender relations, it 
remains unclear whether the same diversity ideologies are equally effective for promoting race 
and gender equality. In my dissertation I address this question, examining: (1) which diversity 
ideologies support, rather than disrupt, the status quo, (2) whether system-justifying diversity 
ideologies are the same for race and gender, and (3) what their implications for race and gender 
equality are. 
System Justification: Supporting and Disrupting the Status Quo 
 To understand how diversity ideologies might justify race and gender inequality, it is 
useful to understand how individuals justify inequality more broadly. System justification theory 
argues that people have a psychological need to see current economic, political, and societal 
arrangements (i.e., the “system”) upon which they are dependent as fair, legitimate, and 
necessary (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2009b; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). Thus, individuals 
are motivated to defend, bolster, and justify existing social, economic, and political arrangements 
(Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2009a; 2009b; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Such system justification 
serves a palliative function, and satisfies epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty, existential 
motives to manage threat, and relational motives to coordinate social relationships (Jost et al., 
2009b; Jost & van der Toorn, 2012). Indeed, system-justifying tendencies are an adaptive and 
evolved psychological process of coping (especially when little can be done to change the 
system), and as such, system justification is endorsed by not only those in power, but those in 
lower-status positions as well (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Kay & Zanna, 2009).  
System justification revolves around support for the current system, which (at least in the 
context of the United States) is rife with inequality, unfairness, and oppression. Thus, it should 
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not be surprising that it is related to ideologies that support inequality and hierarchy, such as 
political conservatism, social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism (Huddy, 
2004; Everett, 2013; Jost et al., 2009a; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; 2009). However, many people 
adopt system-justifying beliefs for benevolent reasons as well, such as their preference for 
ignorance, their desire to manage anxiety and feel control, or when the system is inevitable or 
inescapable (Jost et al., 2009a; Jost & Hunyady, 2002; Shepherd & Kay, 2012). To justify their 
need to see the world as fair, despite the injustices that exist, many individuals adopt beliefs, use 
rationales, and selectively interpret information that serves their psychological need to 
understand, predict, and often rationalize current societal arrangements (Jost et al., 2009a).  
Ideologies as Motivated Cognition 
 With regards to race and gender, existing social arrangements and power structures are 
far from fair: women and racial minorities are vastly underrepresented in positions of power 
(Catalyst, 2016; Fortune, 2017). To rationalize the disconnect of this situation with many 
people’s desire for equality, individuals can use a number of system-justifying means to satisfy 
the overarching goal of imbuing the system with legitimacy (Jost & Hunyady, 2002; 2009; Kay 
& Jost, 2003). Indeed, research has identified several distinct but related system-justifying 
rationales, which aid in justifying the status quo. While many rationales can be used to justify 
inequality, a number of related ideologies fall into two broad buckets: (1) rationales that deny 
systemic problems, placing the blame on the target of injustice and away from the system, such 
as the Protestant work ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988), endorsement of meritocracy (Son Hing et al., 
2011), denial of system problems (Jost & Hunyady, 2002), and minimization of privilege 
(Phillips & Lowery, 2015); and (2) rationales that endorse and legitimize inequality, rationalizing 
inequality as the “natural order” of things, such as biological essentialism (Brescoll, Uhlman, & 
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Newman, 2013) and social role or complementarity stereotyping (Kay & Jost, 2003).3 Though 
Jost and Hunyady (2009) argue that these rationales share similar antecedents, psychological 
processes, and outcomes, it is important to note their differences, as both the context of and the 
motivated reasoning behind their use has distinct effects on individuals, groups, and systems.  
In other words, people choose rationales that can legitimize the status quo in a way that 
fits their beliefs and values. Importantly, these rationales need not be universally applied to all 
elements of the system, as certain rationales better justify different forms of inequality. Thus, 
even within the same overarching political ideology, individuals adopt a number of different 
rationales to explain and justify the status quo (Jayaratne et al., 2006; Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013). 
For example, those with a politically conservative ideology similarly desire to rationalize their 
dominance and power over African Americans and homosexuals (Chambers, Schlenker & 
Collison, 2013); however, they do not use the same system-justifying rationales for both groups. 
To justify racial inequality, political conservatives are more likely to endorse biological 
attributions for racial differences to justify the “natural order” of Whites’ dominant position; 
however, for sexual inequality, political conservatives will reject biological attributions for 
homosexuality, as these beliefs imply that homosexuality is natural and should be accepted 
(Jayaratne et al., 2006; Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013). Thus, the same reasoning can be differentially 
applied to justify inequality based on one’s motivations. Though similar attributions can be made 
to justify gender and racial inequality, certain system-legitimizing strategies are more relevant 
and effective for rationalizing each, due to the unique structural dynamics of each group.  
As I will argue, denial or minimization of inequality better serves to justify inequality for 
                                                
3 I acknowledge that social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and opposition to equality also serve 
as system-justifying rationales. For the purpose of this paper, I choose to focus on more benevolent ideologies that 
rationalize inequality, not explicitly support it. 
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race, while biological and social role attributions better serve to justify gender inequality. As a 
consequence, awareness (and blindness) ideologies have different effects on race and gender 
inequality, as they act upon distinct rationalizations for inequality, highlighting opportunity 
differences for race and biological differences for gender.  
Rationales for the Status Quo: Multiple Means for System Justification 
Rationalizing Racial Inequality through Denial of Inequality 
System-justifying explanations that are effective in rationalizing racial inequality revolve 
around denying, ignoring, minimizing, or legitimizing inequality. For example, one rationale 
people use to explain racial inequality is a belief in Protestant work ethic (Katz & Hass, 1988; 
Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Protestant work ethic is one of America’s core values and suggests that 
hard work pays off and any failure to achieve success is due to personal shortcomings and a lack 
of effort (Katz & Hass, 1988; Levy, West, Ramirez, & Karafantis, 2006). By assuming that all 
individuals have equal opportunity for success, one can rationalize inequality between Blacks 
and Whites by assuming any economic disparities must be due to Whites’ better work ethic and 
Blacks’ lack of motivation, rather than any structural or systemic problems (Katz & Hass, 1988; 
Levy et al., 2006).  
Similarly, beliefs in meritocracy, which are policies and practices where wealth, jobs, and 
power are distributed based on merit (intelligence, effort; Son Hing et al., 2011), can also 
rationalize the inequality between Blacks and Whites (Jost & Hunyady, 2009). While 
meritocracy seems like the epitome of fairness, it provides an effective system-justifying 
rationale as it allows those in power to believe that their greater privilege is due to hard work and 
fairness, rather than any special, hidden advantages they may receive as a consequence of their 
race, class, or gender (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Phillips & Lowery, 2015).  
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Finally, denial of inequality or privilege provides an effective system-justifying rationale 
(Jost & Hunyady, 2002; 2009). That is, individuals have a motivation to be “blind” to racial 
inequality, and studies show Whites often significantly underestimate the proportion of racial 
minorities who are incarcerated, poor, or uneducated (Kraus, Rucker & Richeson, 2017; Wolsko 
et al., 2000), and avoid information that suggests otherwise (Shepherd & Kay, 2012). By being 
willfully ignorant, individuals can justify the system by denying and ignoring problems with the 
current system, justifying the (inaccurate) belief that the system is fair and operates as it should 
(Kraus et al., 2017).  
Altogether, this research suggests that ignoring, denying, and rationalizing inequality, 
and/or placing attribution and blame on Black people, serve as effective rationales for justifying 
the status quo. Though other system-justifying rationales, such as biological essentialism and 
social roles, could be (and have been) used to justify racial inequality (see Jayaratne et al., 2006), 
I argue these rationales are less effective (for those with benevolent intentions). Biological 
notions of race were historically used to promote racist ideologies, which dehumanized Blacks, 
by portraying them as less intelligent and evolved (Lott, 1999). Thus, most Americans hold the 
view that espousing biological views of racial differences is, if not inaccurate, at least politically 
incorrect (Suhay & Jayaratne, 2013). Further, endorsing social roles, which suggest certain 
groups are better suited to different roles, is a less effective rationale for racial inequality, as 
Blacks are more likely to occupy low-wage and unskilled occupations (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2017). Thus, arguing that Black people are better suited for jobs that require less skill, 
education, and pay dehumanizes Black people by imbuing them with less ability and intelligence 
compared to their White counterparts.  
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Rationalizing Gender Inequality through Biological, Gender Roles 
As I have argued, rationales such as Protestant work ethic, meritocracy, and denial of 
inequality serve as effective system-justifying rationales for race inequality. Though these 
arguments can be, and are, used to rationalize gender inequality (see Swim et al., 1995), I argue 
that biological essentialism and social role arguments serve as more effective system-justifying 
rationales for gender inequality, due to different dynamics and structural relations between men 
and women. The biological essentialist/social role rationale proceeds as follows: Due to their 
biological interdependence, where men and women’s different sex organs orient them in distinct 
reproductive roles, men and women have historically occupied different, yet complementary, 
social roles. Men’s greater size and strength placed them in work roles, where their skills and 
abilities were better suited for providing economically; while women’s childbearing ability 
placed them in domestic roles, where their skills and abilities were better suited for child-rearing 
(Eagly, 1987; 1997; 2013).  
Due to the reality and acceptance of these biological gender differences, biological 
essentialism provides an effective system-justifying rationale for gender inequality, as it 
legitimizes the gender hierarchy, by portraying it as the “natural order.” Biological essentialism 
is the belief that individuals have an underlying “essence” that is deeply rooted in biological 
underpinnings, with sharp boundaries that are unsusceptible to sociocultural shaping (Haslam, 
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Bastian & Haslam, 2006). Thus, by arguing that women have 
biological roles (i.e., child-bearer, mother) that make them better suited for different roles and/or 
occupations, individuals can rationalize the status quo by seeing gender differences in domains 
of power as natural, functional, and inevitable. Indeed, past work has shown support for the 
utility of biological rationales for system justification, where gender essentialism relates to 
  13 
system justification (Kray, Howland, Russell, & Jackman, 2017), and where, after system threat, 
individuals are more likely to endorse gender essentialism (Brescoll et al., 2013). 
Further, endorsing gender/social roles—or the role-based division of labor between men 
and women—and imbuing women and men with complementary features similarly serves to 
rationalize the status quo. That is, when people believe that men and women possess different 
characteristics (men as agentic, women as communal), they often believe that men and women 
possess distinct skills, abilities, and dispositions that make men better suited for high-power 
leadership roles and women better suited for communal, caretaking roles (Eagly, 1997; 2013 
Wood & Eagly, 2012). Thus, confronted with the reality that men are overrepresented in 
positions of power, endorsing gender/social roles allows individuals to believe that men are 
better suited for these positions, and therefore serves to rationalize the status quo. Indeed, past 
work has shown that such complementary gender stereotyping serves to increase system 
justification (Jost & Kay, 2005), and provides an effective means to rationalize the status quo 
(Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). 
Although individuals can and often do use rationalizations that deny, ignore, and 
minimize gender inequality (Swim, Aiken, Hall & Hunter, 1995), I argue that these arguments 
are less effective than biological, social-role arguments. Due to men and women’s 
complementarity and interdependence, most hold benevolent views of women, seeing them as 
dependent on and in need of protection by men (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 2001), not necessarily 
lazy, unmotivated, or deserving of economic despair (Hall et al., 2014). Supporting this 
assumption, past research has shown that activation of communal and benevolent stereotypes 
increased system justification, whereas activation of hostile (denial of inequality or victim-
blaming) sexism did not (Jost & Kay, 2005).  
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Diversity Ideologies as System-Justifying 
Though awareness ideologies have been argued to be effective for many different types 
of intergroup relations (Galinsky et al., 2015), I argue that individuals should have different 
preferences for blindness and awareness ideologies depending on the intergroup differences 
focused upon and their ability to rationalize inequality (i.e., the status quo). In this section, I 
outline which types of race and gender differences are affected by diversity ideologies and the 
role they play in system justification. I compare and contrast race and gender awareness 
ideologies on system justification (and outcomes) for ease of comparison and presentation, as 
well as demonstrate the divergent outcomes of using the same ideology to combat race and 
gender inequality.  
Race-Blindness and Support for the Status Quo 
I argue that race awareness serves as a system-disrupting ideology, while race blindness 
serves as a system-justifying one, allowing Whites to deny, ignore, and be “blind” to inequality. 
A race-blind approach posits that we should ignore category memberships because racial 
differences are superficial (surface-level) characteristics that should not affect opportunity in 
society (Markus et al., 2000). By focusing on fairness and equality in judgment and treatment, 
Blacks and Whites should have an equal chance for success (Knowles, Lowery, Hogan & Chow, 
2009), which supports the system as fair, equitable, and just. However, the types of differences 
race blindness often disregards are not superficial or surface-level; they are important differences 
in histories, judgments, treatments, expectations, and circumstances that affect one’s reality and 
opportunities in many ways (Markus et al., 2000). Thus, deemphasizing racial differences serves 
to suppress and ignore differences in opportunities, judgments, and other factors that might shape 
Blacks’ ability to achieve success.  
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By ignoring such external differences that limit opportunity, individuals often rely on 
ethnocentric standards and stereotypes (e.g., lack of motivation and effort) to explain differences 
that exist between racial groups (Schofield, 1986). Since ignoring racial differences in 
opportunity and treatment rationalizes their dominant position in society, it is unsurprising that 
the preferred and prevailing ideology amongst Whites is a race-blind approach (Markus et al., 
2000; Plaut 2002). In other words, race blindness seems to represent the status quo, serving a 
palliative function, by allowing Whites to justify the current social order and feel more 
comfortable with their privileged standing in society (Fryberg & Stephens, 2010). These 
arguments suggest that for race, the types of differences being suppressed through blindness 
(experiences, opportunity) and purpose for suppressing them (maintain current power structure) 
create a context where race blindness preserves oppression and degrades interracial relations. 
Thus, awareness should serve to expose opportunity-limiting differences and economic 
inequality and therefore lessen support for the status quo. In support for a race-aware approach, 
Markus, Steele, and Steele (2000) note,  
The effort to achieve [the American commitment to opportunity] should 
acknowledge [ethnic] group differences in status and lived experiences... Based 
on a given group identity, one is exposed to a potentially limiting and devaluing 
concert of representations, historical narratives, possible judgments, treatments, 
interactions, expectations and affective reactions that affects one’s social reality in 
many ways (p. 235).  
These arguments suggest that race awareness is necessary to understand the unique 
challenges faced by minority groups, in order to provide, create, and adopt policies that address 
how these experiences affect their potential to succeed in a White-dominated power structure. 
Indeed, past work on race awareness has shown that majority group members who endorse, or 
are exposed to, race-aware beliefs are less likely to endorse system-justifying rationales, such as 
Protestant work ethic (Verkuyten & Brug, 2004) and anti-egalitarian attitudes (Wolsko et al., 
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2006). Thus, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a: Endorsement of race awareness will be negatively related to system-
justifying beliefs. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Endorsement of race awareness will be negatively related to denial of 
racial inequality. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Denial of inequality will mediate the relationship between race 
awareness and system justification, such that race awareness will lessen denial of 
inequality, which in turn, will lessen support for the status quo.   
 
Gender Awareness and Support for the Status Quo 
 I argue that gender awareness serves as a system-justifying ideology, as it allows men to 
endorse, rationalize, and embrace status and role-based differences between men and women. 
Proponents of a gender-aware approach argue that men and women differ in a number of 
important ways and by denying such differences we are both ignoring the critical barriers facing, 
and devaluing the characteristics we associate with, women (Annis & Merron, 2014; Krawcheck, 
2017). However, the differences highlighted through awareness are often not opportunity or 
experience ones, but rather dispositional differences, based on biology and social roles, which 
connote a range of skill, ability, and personality differences (Martin & Phillips, 2017). For 
example, in advocating for being gender-aware, Baron Cohen (2003) notes,   
The hope is that laying out what we understand about essential differences in the 
minds of men and women [through awareness] may lead to greater acceptance 
and respect of difference... people with the female brain make the most wonderful 
counselors, primary-school teachers, nurses... social workers, or personnel staff. 
People with the male brain make the most wonderful scientists, engineers... 
bankers, toolmakers, programmers, or even lawyers (p. 281, 287).  
 Baron-Cohen argues that both the “male brain” and “female brain” possess different, 
valuable functions—neither being better than the other and both necessary for a functional 
society; however, the former entails skills more suited for roles and occupations with power, 
prestige, and influence, whereas the latter is better suited for communal roles involving 
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caretaking and empathizing: valuable, but in lower-status occupations. Indeed, in the United 
States, this is the current reality, where men are overrepresented in positions of power (CEOs, 
politics), and women are more likely to be in communal roles (nursing, teaching; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2018). Thus, gender awareness serves to justify the status quo, allowing men to 
rationalize the occupational segregation between men and women.  
Further, these differences are thought to be driven by innate, biological sources and are 
therefore seen as functional and natural, being widely accepted and endorsed (Martin & Parker, 
1995; Taylor & Gelman, 1991). This is problematic for reducing inequality as believing men’s 
greater agency is due to innate, biological factors implies that these differences are inevitable and 
unlikely to change (Bem, 1993), confining men and women to different roles, and limiting 
women’s opportunities. Indeed, biological attributions and social role endorsement have been 
linked to rationalization of inequality (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990) and endorsement of the status 
quo (Brescoll et al., 2013; Jost & Kay, 2005). Thus, it is unsurprising that the preferred ideology 
for gender tends to be awareness (Hahn et al., 2015; Koenig & Richeson, 2010). Attributing 
gender differences to natural causes allows individuals to endorse and reinforce the power 
structure, where men are overrepresented and women are underrepresented in positions of power 
and influence. Indeed, past work on gender awareness has shown that majority group members 
who endorse, or are exposed to, gender-aware beliefs are less likely to endorse system-justifying 
rationales, such as biological attributions for, and deterministic beliefs about, gender (Hahn et al., 
2015; Martin & Phillips, 2017). Thus, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2a: Endorsement of gender awareness will be positively related to system-
justifying beliefs. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Endorsement of gender awareness will be positively related to biological 
essentialism. 
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Hypothesis 2c: Biological essentialism will mediate the relationship between gender 
awareness and system justification, such that gender awareness will increase biological 
essentialism, which in turn will increase support for the status quo.   
 
A notable point about both race and gender diversity ideologies is that they are often 
devoid of content. Rarely are the types of differences one should embrace or minimize through 
awareness and blindness embedded in the messages and manipulations. Thus, individuals are left 
to make their own attributions, which understandably are those that support their motivated 
desire to justify the status quo. As I will later argue, it is the ambiguity around these messages 
that causes these divergent effects, and by directing these messages toward external rationales, 
gender awareness has the same potential to recognize inequality and disrupt the status quo. 
Overview of Studies 
 In four studies, I test the hypotheses that blindness and awareness approaches 
differentially support the status quo (or the “system”) for race and gender respectively, arguing 
that race awareness will be negatively and gender awareness positively related to system 
justification (Hypotheses 1a and 2a). In Study 1, I validate awareness scales (to be used 
throughout my remaining studies) and provide a preliminary test of my hypotheses. In Study 2, I 
replicate the divergent relationship between race and gender awareness endorsement on system 
justification, using two separate samples. In Study 3, I manipulate ideological beliefs and 
examine their effects on system-justifying rationales. For race, I operationalize the system-
justifying rationale as “denial of inequality” and for gender, I operationalize the system-
justifying rationale as “biological essentialism.” Using these rationales for inequality, I show that 
race awareness exposes inequality facing Black people (lessening denial of inequality), while 
gender awareness heightens biological attributions for difference (increasing essentialism; 
Hypotheses 1b and 2b), which in turn lessens and heightens system justification, respectively 
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(Hypotheses 1c and 2c). 
Before presenting studies and results, several methodological choices are worth 
elaboration. First, although both minority and majority group members have been shown to 
support the status quo (Kay et al., 2009; Jost and Vandertoorn, 2012), much work has shown that 
racial minorities and women show different endorsement of, and react differently to, diversity 
ideologies (see Ryan et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2005; Martin & Phillips, 2017). Thus, I solely 
examine out-group members (Whites for race, men for gender), to align with past research and 
findings. Second, my hypotheses rest on the assumption that participants internalize the 
ideology—not just that they are exposed to it. According to system justification, those who 
receive ideological messages that challenge their beliefs tend to anchor more strongly on them 
and show more support for the system (as it is under threat; Jost et al., 2009a; Brescoll et al., 
2013). Thus, I examine participants who at least “somewhat” agreed with the ideology after 
reading the content of the manipulation. As both ideologies aim to achieve intergroup equality, 
many express ambivalence and uncertainty about which approach to endorse (MTV Bias Survey, 
2014). Thus, diversity ideologies are less likely to evoke system threat (as the core value of 
“equality” is not being challenged), and much work has found that individuals are amenable to 
adoption of either (Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013). 
Study 1: Scale Validation of an Awareness Measure 
The purpose of Study 1 is threefold. The first goal is to develop and validate a scale that 
matches items for race and gender diversity ideologies, removing any potential confounds from 
the different scales used in past research, and therefore accurately comparing the endorsement of 
race and gender ideologies. Second, I would like to show that this scale has internal, convergent, 
and divergent validity, as well as relates to past measures in the expected way. Finally, I aim to 
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provide an initial test of the divergent relationship between awareness for race and gender and 
system justification (and their accompanying rationales). Examining Hypotheses 1 and 2, I 
believe that race and gender ideologies justify and legitimize the system in different ways: while 
for race, awareness exposes the unique (often negative) experiences and opportunities facing 
Blacks (thereby reducing system justification), for gender, awareness legitimizes and solidifies 
assumptions of essential, skill-based differences between men and women (thereby increasing 
system justification). 
For sufficient power, in my initial study, I used a sensitivity power analysis, choosing 
100 participants per cell as this can detect an effect size of a minimum of (r =.25 at 1-ß =.80, α 
=.05; Fritz, Morris, & Richler, 2012). From the results of Study 1, a power analysis (1-ß =.80, α 
=.05, r =.31) determined 30 participants were needed per cell for the remainder of the studies; 
however, I felt this was not conservative enough, and to ensure adequate power, each subsequent 
design sought at least 40 participants per study cell. 
Participants and Procedure 
 One hundred and eighty-six out-group participants (Whites in race, and men in gender, 
conditions) took part in a study on “Attitudes and Opinions.” Four participants were removed for 
failing a manipulation check asking which group they were asked questions about. In the race 
condition, the final sample consisted of eighty-one White participants (47% men; Mage = 38.22, 
SD = 12.00; Mworkexp = 16.14, SD = 7.91, 51% with a bachelor’s degree or more education). In 
the gender condition, the final sample consisted of 91 men (71% White; Mage = 35.43, SD = 
11.85; Mworkexp = 14.29, SD = 8.49, 48% with a bachelor’s degree or more education).  
Independent Variable: Awareness 
To examine an individual’s awareness endorsement, I collected all the items I could find 
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in published literature on race and gender ideologies (Hahn et al., 2015; Knowles et al., 2009; 
Koenig & Richeson, 2010; Martin & Phillips, 2017; Wolsko et al., 2006). Items chosen for my 
final scale needed to pass three criteria: 1) they needed to apply to both race and gender (i.e., 
items that only applied to race/gender issues were excluded); 2) they needed to be benevolent 
(i.e., items that were negatively valenced were excluded); 3) they needed to be devoid of types of 
differences (i.e., items that directed attention toward culture or skills were excluded). After 
narrowing down relevant items, ten items were selected, five measuring awareness endorsement 
and five measuring blindness endorsement. Example items for awareness include: “Differences 
between [racial groups] [men and women] should be acknowledged and celebrated” and “[There 
are many differences between racial groups] [Men and women have many differences] that are 
important to acknowledge and embrace.” Example items for blindness include: “Focusing on 
differences between [racial groups] [men and women] undermines social cooperation and 
progress” and “It is important to pay attention to the individual characteristics that make a person 
unique rather than their [ethnic or racial background] [gender].” See Appendix A for full scale. 
System Justification 
 To measure system justification, I used the eight-item scale from Kay and Jost (2003). 
This scale measures the extent to which individuals believe that the current state of society is 
just, fair, and operates as it should. Participants rated their endorsement on a scale from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .88). An example item includes, “In general, the 
American political system operates as it should.” See Appendix A for full scale.  
Related Variables  
 I collected a number of scales used in past work on racial and gender ideologies to 
establish convergent and divergent validity. To support my predictions, I collected measures that 
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capture relevant system-justifying rationales: (1) denial of inequality measures, such as: 
opportunity attributions, minimization of inequality, and Protestant work ethic (Katz &Hass, 
1988; Mazzocco, Cooper, & Flint, 2012; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004), as well as essential, role-
based rationales, such as biological attributions, biological essentialism, role-based stereotypes, 
and benevolent prejudice (Coleman & Hong, 2008; Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Glick & Fiske, 
2001). See Appendix A for all items used. 
 (2) Denial of inequality. To capture participant’s denial of inequality, I used four scales 
from past work: attributions for intergroup differences (Martin & Parker, 1995), modern 
prejudice (Swim et al., 1995), symbolic prejudice (Sears, 1988), and Protestant work ethic (Katz 
& Hass, 1988). To measure opportunity attributions for differences, I used the Opportunity 
Attribution Item (from Martin & Parker, 1995), asking, “When [Black and White people] [men 
and women] differ in some way, how likely is it that the difference is due to opportunity (i.e., the 
kinds of opportunities each group has had [access and exposure to resources])” on a scale from 1 
= not at all likely to 7 = very likely. Modern prejudice was measured using Swim et al.’s (1995) 
eight-item scale, with items such as, “Discrimination against [Black people] [women] is no 
longer a problem in the U.S.” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; a =.94). The eight-
item Symbolic Prejudice Scale (Sears, 1988) was presented only in the race condition, as it is 
specific to prejudice affecting Blacks (e.g., “Generations of slavery have created conditions that 
make it difficult for Black people to work their way out of the lower class (reversed)”). Items 
were transformed to a four-point scale, where higher scores represent greater symbolic prejudice 
(a = .93). Finally, Protestant Work Ethic (PWE) was measured with Katz and Hass’s (1988) 
eleven-item scale, with items such as, “Most people who don't succeed in life are just lazy” (1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; a = .84). 
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 (3) Biological, social roles.  
To capture biological, role-based rationales, I used four scales from past work: biological 
attributions for intergroup differences (Martin & Parker, 1995), biological essentialism (Coleman 
& Hong (2008), social role stereotypes (Diekman & Eagly, 2000), and benevolent sexism (Glick 
& Fiske, 1996).  
To measure biological attributions for difference, I used the Biological Attribution Item 
(from Martin & Parker, 1995), asking, “When [Black and White people] [men and women] differ 
in some way, how likely is it that the difference is due to biology: biological factors (hormones, 
chromosomes, etc.)?” on a scale from 1 = not at all likely to 7 = very likely. For Biological 
Essentialism, I used a measure adapted from Coleman and Hong (2008), asking eight questions 
such as, “When [racial groups] [men and women] differ in some way, it is likely that the 
difference is due to biological factors.” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree; a = .80).  
For stereotyping, I captured relevant gender role (Diekman & Eagly, 2000) and race 
(Wolsko et al., 2000) stereotypes in the gender and race conditions, respectively. For gender, I 
used agency (independent, assertive, aggressive, competitive, analytic, leader-like; a = .82) and 
communality (sympathetic, gentle, kind, warm, nurturing, sensitive; a = .87) stereotypes. For 
race, I used positive (religious, athletic, rhythmic, spiritual, musical; a = .70), and negative 
(aggressive, poor, uneducated, violent, threatening; a = .80) cultural stereotypes, on a scale from 
1 = much more characteristic of men [Whites] to 5 = much more characteristic of women 
[Blacks] (counterbalanced). For gender, agency stereotypes were reversed and combined with 
communality (a = .87), and for race, positive and negative stereotypes were combined (a = .71), 
such that higher scores represent more traditional gender and race stereotyping.  
Finally, in the gender conditions, I captured benevolent sexism, a form of sexism which 
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imbues women with positive, communal qualities (but undermines agency, seeing them as 
dependent on men), using the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Rollero, Glick & Tartaglia, 
2012). An example item includes, “Women should be cherished and protected by men” (a = .87). 
I included the other subcomponent of the ASI scale measuring hostile sexism (antagonistic 
beliefs about women’s desire to control; a = .92). An example item includes, “Women 
exaggerate problems they have at work.” In line with hypotheses, and past work (e.g., Koenig & 
Richeson, 2010), I expected gender awareness to relate to benevolent, but not hostile sexism.  
Results 
Awareness Measure 
 My awareness measure was reliable overall (a = .78) and both within the race (a = .76) 
and gender (a = .80) conditions. Subjecting the items to a principal components factor analysis 
with direct oblimin rotation (Conway & Huffcutt, 2003) yielded two factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one (3.49 and 2.78), representing awareness and blindness items and capturing 
34.93% and 27.79% of the variance respectively (all loadings > .60). Note these findings are 
almost identical when separating by race (eigenvalues: 3.55 and 2.93; all loadings > .52) and 
gender (eigenvalues: 3.73 and 2.52; all loadings > .47). 
In line with past research on ideologies (see Koenig & Richeson, 2010; Martin & 
Phillips, 2017; Ryan et al., 2007), I measured awareness using one scale, reversing the blindness 
items such that the measure ranged from 1= more blind to 7 = more aware. This is appropriate 
because although the factor analysis revealed two distinct factors, they are negatively related (r = 
-.11), and combining allows for simplified presentation (results do not differ using each scale 
separately). Further, past work on ideologies has shown both theoretically and empirically that 
awareness/blindness can represent a single construct (Koenig & Richeson, 2010; Martin & 
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Phillips, 2017). Thus, for the sake of simplicity and in keeping with past research I use a single 
scale throughout the paper, which captures the extent to which individuals endorse a blind versus 
aware ideology. The mean for this scale did not differ between the race (M = 4.31; SD = 0.94; 
range: 1.50 – 6.70) and gender (M = 4.36; SD = 0.90; range: 1.30 – 6.70 conditions, F(1, 170) = 
.16, p = .69, ηp2 = .001. 
Relationships Between Variables 
 Since I hypothesize that this awareness measure will relate to distinct forms of bias for 
racial minorities and women, I analyze the relationships between variables within each condition. 
 Race. As expected, I find a significant relationship between race awareness endorsement 
and system justification, r = -.45, p < .001, suggesting that those who endorsed race awareness 
were less likely to endorse system-justifying beliefs (Hypothesis 1a). Further, in line with 
predictions (Hypothesis 1b), the more participants endorsed race awareness, the more likely they 
were to attribute racial differences to opportunity (r = .24, p = .034) and the less likely they were 
to endorse modern forms of prejudice, which deny limited opportunities and discrimination 
facing Black people (rmodern = -.44, p < .001; rsymbolic = -.35, p < .001; rPWE = -.22, p = .049). In 
line with my predictions, race awareness did not relate to biological attributions for difference (r 
= .15, p = .17) or racial essentialism (r = .07, p = .52). While awareness did not relate to overall 
racial stereotyping (r = .11, p = .34), it did relate to positive (r = .25, p = .023) but not negative (r 
= -.06, p = .58) stereotyping. See Table 1. 
 Gender. In line with my hypotheses, gender awareness was positively related to system 
justification (r = .31, p = .003), suggesting that gender awareness is a system-justifying ideology 
(Hypothesis 2a). Supporting hypothesis 2b, gender awareness was positively related to biological 
attributions (r = .52, p < .001), gender essentialism (r = .62, p < .001), gender stereotyping 
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(roverall = .38, p < .001; ragency = .38, p < .001; rcommunal = .30, p = .003), and benevolent sexism (r 
= .39, p < .001). Counter to hypotheses, gender awareness was also related to hostile sexism (r = 
.41, p < .001), a finding which I elaborate upon in the discussion. Further, while gender 
awareness was not related to opportunity attributions for difference (ropp = -.19, p = .07), it was 
positively related to denial of inequality (rmodern = .49, p < .001; rPWE = .43, p < .001); my 
argument rests on the notion that gender awareness is more strongly related to biological, 
essential system-justifying rationales, not that it does not relate to the denial of inequality overall 
(indeed, biological essentialism can be used to deny inequality). In line with this hypothesis, 
effects are stronger for biological rationales (r’s > .60) compared to denial of inequality (r’s > 
.40). See Table 2. 
Mediation 
 I next sought to examine how essentialism and modern prejudice differentially provide 
rationale to justify the status quo (Hypothesis 1c and 2c). That is, my argument rests on the 
assumption that awareness for race forces Whites to acknowledge the different circumstances 
facing Blacks, diminishing denial of discrimination. In contrast, awareness for gender justifies 
the status quo, as it allows men to “embrace” the natural, biological differences between men and 
women, enabling them to justify inequality. Thus, I should find that participants’ lesser 
endorsement of modern prejudice mediates the relationship between race awareness and system 
justification, while participants’ greater endorsement of biological essentialism mediates the 
relationship between gender awareness and system justification.  
To test this assumption, I ran two moderated mediations using PROCESS Model 8 
(Hayes, 2013; 2015 Preacher & Hayes, 2008; 2004). I use an indirect effect of the highest-order 
product term to infer whether the moderation is mediated (Hayes, 2013). This statistic tests 
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whether the indirect effect of the independent variable (awareness endorsement) on the 
dependent variable (system justification) through the mediators (denial of inequality, biological 
essentialism) is moderated by social category (race versus gender). I predicted that I would find 
divergent effects of awareness on system justification through different mechanisms. For race, 
participants should use denial of inequality as a system-justifying mechanism. For gender, 
participants should use biological essentialism as a system-justifying mechanism.  
 For denial of inequality as a system-legitimizing ideology, I find a significant highest 
order interaction, indirect effect = .58, SE = .15, CI95 = .31, .89, where denial of inequality 
provided a system-legitimizing ideology in both the race, indirect effect = -.28, SE = .10, CI95 = -
.48, .10, and gender, indirect effect = .30, SE = .08, CI95 = .15, .47, conditions (although in 
different directions). See Model 1a. For essentialism, as expected, I find a significant highest 
order interaction, indirect effect = .16, SE = .09, CI95 = .01, .36, for the divergent effects of 
awareness endorsement on system justification through essentialism as a function of social 
category. That is, for gender, the relationship between awareness and system justification was 
significantly mediated by essentialist beliefs about gender differences, indirect effect = .18, SE = 
.09, CI95 = .01, .35. However, for race, essentialist beliefs did not provide for a significant 
mechanism to justify inequality, indirect effect = .02, SE = .04, CI95 = -.06, .11. See Figure 1. 
Discussion Study 1 
 Study 1 validated a scale to measure awareness endorsement where the same items apply 
to both race and gender ideologies (the first scale to my knowledge to do so). Further, in 
examining the relationship between awareness and other scales to provide convergent and 
divergent validity, I simultaneously supported my initial hypotheses about the divergent 
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relationships between race and gender awareness and system justification, and its accompanying 
rationales (Hypotheses 1a-b and 2a-b). 
For race, I find that those who more strongly endorse race awareness are also less likely 
to endorse system-justifying beliefs. Further, the relationship of race awareness to other variables 
helps shed insight into why awareness may be a system-disrupting ideology, whereby those who 
endorse race awareness are more likely to see racial differences as due to opportunity, and 
therefore recognize inequality (or deny inequality less). Indeed, denial of inequality provides a 
rationale for system justification, significantly mediating the relationship between awareness and 
system justification (Hypothesis 1c). Further, I show the specific relationship between race 
awareness and denial of inequality, where awareness specifically related to denial of inequality 
but not other system-justifying rationales such as biological essentialism.  
For gender, I find the opposite pattern for awareness and system justification, whereby 
those who more strongly endorse gender awareness are more likely to endorse system-justifying 
beliefs. The relationship between gender awareness biological/essential attributions for 
difference helps explain why this relationship exists. That is, those who endorse gender 
awareness are also more likely to attribute gender differences to biological factors, which 
provides a system-justifying rationale (Hypothesis 2c). Indeed, I find essentialism provides a 
rationale for system justification, significantly mediating the relationship between gender 
awareness and system justification. 
 While confirming several hypotheses of interest, I also found several notable effects. 
First, while denial of inequality provided a parsimonious rationale for race awareness in 
explaining the relationship between awareness and system justification, I find that both 
biological essentialism and denial of inequality provided a system-justifying rationale for gender, 
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such that those who supported gender awareness were also more likely to deny inequality. 
However, in line with hypotheses, I find that gender awareness more strongly related to 
biological essentialism (r = .62) compared to modern forms of prejudice (r’s > .42). One 
explanation for this finding is that essentialism provides a rationale to deny inequality (i.e., those 
who believe gender differences are due to natural, functional, and biological factors should also 
be more likely to think gender inequality does not exist).  
 Further, as I have argued, diversity ideologies are benevolent, suggesting that they should 
not relate to hostile sexism. However, I find that gender awareness was positively related to 
hostile sexism. As Glick and Fiske (1997) note, benevolent and hostile sexism are often related 
(r = .50 [on average], but only r = .18 in this study), as both serve to justify patriarchy and 
traditional gender roles (Glick & Fiske, 1997; Glick et al., 2001). Thus, as an individual 
difference, gender awareness may relate to hostile sexism, but it is unclear whether manipulating 
ideological endorsement affects these attitudes. Indeed, one weakness with this study is that I did 
not examine hostile prejudices toward racial minorities. Thus, in the next experimental study 
(Study 3), I include a measure of hostile prejudices toward both women and racial minorities.  
Study 2a: Effects of Race or Gender Awareness on System Justification using MBAs  
 
 The goal of Study 2a was to replicate Study 1 with a different sample. To do so, I 
embedded either the race or gender awareness scale as well as the system justification measure, 
in a class survey given to 557 MBA students in their first week of business school at a large, 
private, East Coast university. I restricted the sample to out-group members (Whites in the race 
condition; men in the gender condition) who at least “somewhat” identified with American 
culture. The final sample consisted of 126 Whites in the race condition (66% men; Mage = 27.81; 
SD = 2.31; MWorkExp = 4.66; SD = 2.21; 41% with managerial experience); 124 men the in gender 
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condition (58% White, 5% Black, 23% Asian; 8% Hispanic; 6% Other; Mage = 27.85; SD = 2.09; 
MWorkExp = 4.54; SD = 2.11; 43% with managerial experience). 
 During their first week of class, participants were sent a link with questions regarding 
class material. Embedded in the survey was either the 10-item race awareness (a = .76) or 10-
item gender awareness (a = .72) scale. All participants received the system justification scale 
(arace = .78; agender = .73). All measures were endorsed on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 
= strongly agree.  
Results 
 
 Since there was only one dependent variable being measured, I used a hierarchical linear 
regression to analyze the results, with condition (race versus gender) and awareness endorsement 
entered into the first step, and their interaction entered in the second step. There were no 
significant effects of condition, b = .09, SE = .12, t(247) = .74, p = .46, and awareness 
endorsement, b = -.05, SE = .08, t(247) = -.60, p = .55. However, as expected there was a 
significant interaction between the two, b = -.45, SE = .15, t(246) = -3.03, p = .003. In the race 
condition, there was a significant negative effect of race awareness on system justification, b = -
.25, SE = .10, t(246) = -2.49, p = .01, suggesting again, that race awareness is a system-
disrupting ideology. In contrast, in the gender condition, gender awareness was marginally 
positively related to system justification, b = .20, SE = .11, t(246) = 1.83, p = .068. See Figure 
2a. 
Study 2b: Effects of Race and Gender Awareness on System Justification using MBAs 
 In Study 2a, I find support for Hypotheses 1a and 2a, by replicating the divergent effects 
of race and gender awareness ideologies on system justification using a real-world sample. In 
Study 2b, I aim to replicate the effects of Studies 1 and 2a, showing the divergent relationships 
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between race awareness and gender awareness on system justification, and extend these findings 
by giving participants both the race awareness and gender awareness scale to examine their 
relationship to one another, as well as whether each differentially relates to system justification.  
 Similar to Study 2a, (a non-overlapping sample of) MBA participants took a survey 
during their first week of class. Two hundred and six participants were sent a link with questions 
regarding class material. Embedded in the survey were both the race (a = .60) and gender (a = 
.61) awareness scale.4 All participants received the system justification scale (a = .78). All 
measures were endorsed on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  
 Since participants filled out both race and gender awareness scales, I restricted analysis to 
only White, male, American participants. The final sample consisted of 55 participants (Mage = 
28.20, SD = 2.78; MWorkExp = 4.94, SD = 3.06). As expected, I find that participants’ endorsement 
of race awareness is significantly negatively related to system justification (r = -.32, p = .019) 
and gender awareness is marginally positively related to system justification (r = .26, p = .059), 
again suggesting that while awareness for race represents a system-disrupting ideology, 
awareness for gender seems to represent a system-legitimizing one. See Figure 2b. Further, 
gender awareness and race awareness did not significantly relate to one another (r = .16, p = .25), 
suggesting that endorsements of these ideologies are distinct.  
Discussion 
 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to confirm and corroborate the findings of Study 1, and 
examine whether these findings would extend to a different (non-MTurk) sample, notably MBA 
students in a business school. Further, I again find support for Hypotheses 1a and 2a, by finding 
that race awareness is related to greater, while gender awareness is related to less, system 
                                                
4 Note: Due to the lengthy nature of including both scales, only sixteen items were presented (making each scale 
eight items, rather than ten). Excluded items are noted in Appendix A. 
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justification. Further, in Study 2b, I extended these findings and demonstrate that endorsements 
of race and gender ideologies are distinct—that is, participants do not necessarily endorse 
awareness ideologies overall, and that endorsing an awareness ideology for race does not 
necessitate endorsing an awareness ideology for gender. In the next study, I test my hypotheses 
experimentally, examining whether these beliefs are able to be manipulated, as well as testing 
participants’ baseline ideological beliefs, levels of system justification, and endorsement of 
system-justifying rationales.  
Study 3: Manipulating Ideologies and Examining Effects on System Justification and 
Rationales 
 
 The purpose of Study 3 is to examine whether these ideologies can be manipulated and 
replicate findings from the previous studies, showing that race and gender awareness have 
divergent effects on system justification, where being aware of racial differences exposes 
inequality (diminishes denial of inequality) and being aware of gender differences exacerbates 
essential attributions for differences, both of which differentially serve to justify the status quo. 
Further, I include a control condition to examine the baselines for race and gender ideological 
endorsement, system justification, and endorsement of rationales, to understand whether 
awareness or blindness represents the status quo for race and gender, respectively.  
Participants and Procedures 
This study used a 2 (social category: race vs. gender) x 3 (ideology: aware vs. blind vs. 
control) design. Three hundred and sixty-five out-group participants (Whites in race condition; 
men in gender condition) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk took part in what was ostensibly a 
two-part study on 1) “Reflecting on Current Issues in Society” and 2) “Attitudes and 
Evaluations.” Thirty participants (8%) were excluded from analysis for disagreeing with the 
premise of the ideology they were given (and therefore, rejecting the ideology). As previously 
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mentioned, my hypotheses rest on the assumption that participants internalize the ideology—not 
just that they are exposed to it. Further, fourteen participants were removed for failing a 
manipulation check (asking which social category and ideology they were asked to reflect upon). 
This left a remaining sample of 174 White participants in the race condition (36% men; Mage = 
38.54; SD = 11.80) and 135 men in the gender condition (73% White; Mage = 35.78; SD = 10.62).  
Following the procedure by Wolsko et al. (2000), participants in all conditions were told 
that we were interested in views of current issues in society and that “before the exercise we 
would like you to reflect on the current state of [race] [gender] relations in the United States.” In 
the ideological manipulation conditions, participants were given primes, adapted from Wolsko et 
al. (2000), which indicated that the ideology they received was aimed toward achieving equality. 
Specifically, participants were told that, “sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political 
scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a number-one concern for the United States” and 
“have been working to understand how to approach [race] [gender] differences to create a more 
harmonious society.” In the awareness conditions, they read statements such as: 
We should acknowledge and embrace differences between [ethnic groups] [men and 
women]… each [group] [gender] brings different perspectives to life… and can 
contribute in their own unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense 
of harmony and complementarity among the [various ethnic groups] [sexes]. Each group 
has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these 
strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group and we recognize its 
existence and its importance to the social fabric. We can allow [each group] [both men 
and women] to utilize their assets, to be aware of its own particular problems or 
difficulties, and overall to live up to their potential. Thus, social scientists argue that 
understanding the differences among [ethnic groups] [men and women] is an essential 
component of long-term social harmony and functioning in the U.S.A.  
 
In the blindness conditions, participants read statements, such as: 
Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed our creed in the Declaration of 
Independence that “all men (and women) are created equal.” We must remember that we 
are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United 
States. In order to make the U.S. as and successful as possible, we must think of 
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ourselves as individuals and American citizens. Pretending that [ethnic groups] [men and 
women] approach life in fundamentally different ways is counter-productive. [Racial 
groups] [Men and women] have much more in common than people believe and if we 
can recognize our “sameness” we will be able to work together on difficult and important 
problems within our society, such as technological growth and economic development. 
Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to appreciate that at our 
core, we really are all the same. 
 
Participants listed and selected a number of reasons these strategies could be successful. 
In the control condition, after being asked to reflect on race or gender relations, participants were 
told to move on to the next part of the study. Participants then moved to “Part Two,” and were 
asked about their attitudes and evaluations on either race or gender measures. See Appendix B 
for methods. 
Dependent Variables5 
 Manipulation check. Participants filled out the ten-item awareness measure used in 
Studies 1 and 2, rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree (a = .83). 
 System justification. Participants filled out the system justification measure from 
Studies 1 and 2 (Kay & Jost, 2003) on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a 
= .90). 
 System-justifying rationales. 
                                                
5 I collected measures of hostile (and benevolent) prejudice toward women, using the same scales as in Study 1 (ahost 
= .90 aben = .90), as well as hostile attitudes toward subordinate groups overall, via the four-item Social Dominance 
Orientation scale (SDO; a = .83; Pratto et al., 2013), which is a measure of hostile prejudice toward out-groups (i.e., 
a preference toward inequality and domination over lower status groups). An example item includes, “superior 
groups should dominate inferior groups” (1 = strongly disagree – 7 = strongly agree). I find no difference between 
conditions in endorsement of hostile (p = .28) or benevolent (p = .50) sexism, with no significant contrasts between 
conditions (p’s > .20). Further, I find a main effect whereby those in the race conditions endorsed SDO less, overall, 
F(2, 259) = 14.14, p  < .001, ηp2 = .052, compared to those in the gender condition (Mrace = 2.04, SD = 1.33; Mgender = 
2.61, SD = 1.26); however, there was no effect of ideology (p = .37), no interaction (p = .22), and no significant 
contrasts between ideology on SDO, within race and gender conditions (p’s > .09). See Tables 3—4 and discussion. 
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 Denial of inequality.6 Participants completed the modern prejudice measure from Study 1 
(Swim et al., 1995; a = .89)7 as well as the [White] [male] privilege scale (Swim & Miller, 1999; 
a = .86). An example item for the privilege scale includes, “I do not feel that [White people] 
[men] have any benefits or privileges due to their [race] [sex].” While modern prejudice and 
White/male privilege were conceptualized as distinct attitudinal measures, they related highly 
(r’s > .82 and loaded on a single factor [eigenvalue = 7.87; 61.30% of variance]) and thus, 
privilege items were reversed (denial of privilege) and combined into a single measure of overall 
denial of inequality for ease of presentation (a = .94). 
Biological essentialism. Participants filled out the biological essentialism measure from 
Study 1 (Coleman & Hong, 2008) rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree 
to 7 = strongly agree (a = .86). 
Results 
Analysis Strategy and Expected Results 
Results are analyzed using a 2 (social category: race vs. gender) x 3 (ideology: aware vs. 
blind vs. control) ANOVA. Aside from the manipulation check, where I predicted a main effect 
(i.e., awareness increases, and blindness decreases, race and gender awareness ideological 
endorsement), I expected to find significant 2 (social category) x 3 (ideology) interactions on the 
dependent variables of interest. Specifically, I hypothesized that awareness (compared to 
blindness) would decrease system justification and denial of inequality for race, but in contrast, 
                                                
6 I also captured symbolic prejudice in the race condition (Sears, 1988; a = .90) and find a significant effect of 
ideology, F(2, 145) = 4.52, p = .013, ηp2 = .059. Those in the awareness condition (M = 1.83, SD = .54) endorsed 
symbolic prejudice significantly less than those in the blindness (M = 2.22, SD = .73; p = .006) and control (M = 
2.13, SD = .70; p = .022) conditions. The control and blind conditions did not differ from one another (p = .48), 
suggesting that awareness diminishes symbolic prejudice. 
 
7 Note: due to a programming error, this scale was measured on a 5-point scale in the gender condition, and a 7-point 
scale in the race condition; thus, it was re-scaled and standardized within condition to create an accurate comparison.    
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awareness (compared to blindness) would increase system justification and biological 
essentialism for gender. Further, since I argue race blindness and gender awareness are system-
justifying ideologies, I hypothesized that the control condition would be more in line with 
blindness in the race condition, and awareness in the gender condition. See Table 3 for 
correlations between variables. 
Manipulation Check 
 I find no significant effect of social category (p = .94), but as expected, I find a 
significant effect of condition on awareness endorsement, F(2, 259) = 17.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .12, 
and no significant interaction (p = .43), suggesting that the manipulation changed participants’ 
ideological endorsement of awareness. Across both race and gender conditions, individuals 
endorsed the awareness scale significantly more in the awareness condition (M = 4.79, SD = .97) 
compared to the blindness condition (M = 3.91, SD = 1.04), t(259) = 5.85, d = .88, p < .001. 
Notably, the control condition (M = 4.40, SD = .91) fell between (and significantly differed from 
both) the awareness, t(259) = 2.69, d =-.41, p = .008, and blindness, t(259) = -3.40, d = -.50, p < 
.001, conditions. See Table 4 for comparisons across social category conditions.  
System Justification 
 I find no significant effect of social category (p = .74) or ideology (p = .84), but as 
expected, I find a significant 2 (social category) x 3 (ideology) interaction on system 
justification, F(2, 259) = 7.35, p = .001, ηp2 = .054. Supporting Hypothesis 1a, in the race 
conditions, those who were exposed to the awareness message (M = 3.41, SD = 1.39) endorsed 
system justification significantly less than those in the blindness (M = 4.10, SD = 1.22) 
condition, t(259) = -2.45, d = -.53, p = .015. The control condition (M = 3.62, SD = 1.24) did not 
differ from the aware (p = .42), and marginally differed from the blind t(259) = -1.79, d = -.39, p 
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= .074, conditions. Supporting Hypothesis 2a, in the gender conditions, I find the reverse pattern, 
where those exposed to the gender-aware message endorsed system justification significantly 
more (M = 4.19, SD = 1.39) than those exposed to the gender-blind message (M = 3.28, SD = 
1.47), t(259) = 2.96, d = .64, p = .003. The control condition again fell between the two (M = 
3.82, SD = 1.36), not differing from the aware condition (p = .20), and marginally differing from 
the blind condition, t(259) = 1.76, d = .38, p = .08. See Table 4 and Figure 3a. 
System-Justifying Rationales 
Denial of inequality. I find no significant effect of social category (p = .77) or ideology 
(p = .997) on denial of inequality; however, as expected, I find a significant social category x 
ideology interaction, F(2, 259) = 7.02, p = .001, ηp2 = .051. In the race condition, as expected, I 
find that those who were exposed to the awareness message exhibited less denial of inequality 
(M = -.28, SD = .82) than those exposed to the blind message (M = .28, SD = 1.16), t(259) = -
2.76, d = -.56, p = .006 (supporting Hypothesis 1b). The control condition fell in the middle (M = 
.05, SD = .97), marginally differing from the awareness condition, t(259) = -1.68, d = -.37, p = 
.093, but not the blind condition (p = .21). In the gender conditions, I again see the reverse 
pattern, whereby those exposed to the awareness message exhibited more denial of inequality (M 
= .29, SD = 1.05) than those exposed to the blind message (M = -.29, SD = 1.01), t(259) = 2.54, d 
= .56, p = .01. Again, the control condition (M = -.06, SD = .88) did not significantly differ from 
the aware (p = .11), or blind (p = .31), conditions. See Table 4 and Figure 3b. 
Biological essentialism. I find a significant effect of social category on biological 
essentialism, F(1, 259) = 53.27, p < .001, ηp2  = .17. Corroborating my assumptions about the 
essential nature of gender differences, I find that participants endorsed biological essentialism 
significantly more in the gender conditions (M = 4.29, SD = 1.08) compared to the race 
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conditions (M = 3.19, SD = 1.23). I find no significant effect of ideology (p = .77), but as 
expected, I find a significant social category x ideology interaction, F(2, 259) = 5.71, p = .004, 
ηp2 = .042. In the race condition, participants endorsed essentialism marginally less in the race-
aware (M = 2.96, SD = 1.27) compared to the race-blind (M = 3.46, SD = 1.33) condition, t(259) 
= -1.86, d = -.38, p = .06. The control condition fell between the two (M = 3.21, SD = 1.11), not 
significantly differing from either the aware (p = .20) or the blind (p = .49) conditions. In 
contrast, for gender, I find the opposite pattern, where those exposed to the aware message (M = 
4.58, SD = 1.10) endorsed gender essentialism significantly more than those exposed to the blind 
message (M = 3.86, SD = 1.12), t(259) = 2.69, d = .68, p = .008 (supporting Hypothesis 2b). 
Again, the control condition fell between the two (M = 4.34, SD = 1.01), not significantly 
differing from the aware (p = .35), and marginally differing from the blindness condition, t(259) 
= 1.81, d = .47, p = .07. See Table 4 and Figure 3c. 
Moderated Mediation 
 I next sought to examine how denial of inequality and essentialism differentially serve as 
rationales to justify the status quo. That is, my argument rests on the assumption that awareness 
for race disrupts the status quo as it forces Whites to acknowledge the different circumstances 
facing Blacks, diminishing denial of discrimination. In contrast, for gender, awareness justifies 
the status quo, as it allows men to “embrace” the natural, biological differences between men and 
women, thus enabling them to justify inequality. To test this assumption, I again ran two 
moderated mediations using PROCESS model 8 (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008), using 
an indirect effect of the highest-order product term to infer whether the moderation is mediated 
(Hayes, 2013). I predicted that I would find divergent effects of awareness on system 
justification for race and gender, through different mechanisms. For race, there should be a 
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significant indirect effect of awareness on system justification through denial of inequality, 
whereas for gender, there should be a significant indirect effect of awareness on system 
justification through biological essentialism. 
 Supporting Hypothesis 1c, for the moderated mediation through denial of inequality, I 
find significant highest order interaction, indirect effect = -.78, SE = .25, CI95 = -1.30, -.31, such 
that there was a significant indirect effect at both the value of race, indirect effect = .38, SE = .16, 
CI95 = .09, .72, and the value of gender, indirect effect = -.40, SE = .18, CI95 = -.76, -.07. Again, 
these indirect effects were in opposite directions, and are consistent with Study 1, where denial 
of inequality provides a system-justifying rationale for both race and gender; for race, awareness 
leads to less denial of inequality, while for gender awareness leads to more denial of inequality. 
See Figure 4a. For the moderated mediation through biological essentialism, I again find a 
significant highest order interaction, indirect effect = -.44, SE = .18, CI95 = -.85, -.14. In line with 
Hypothesis 2c, at the value of race, there was no significant indirect effect, indirect effect = .19, 
SE = .12, CI95 = -.001, .45; however, at the value of gender, there was a significant indirect effect 
of awareness on system justification through essentialism, indirect effect = -.25, SE = .11, CI95 = 
-.49, -.07. See Figure 4b. This suggests that while denial of inequality provides a system-
justifying rationale for both race and gender awareness (though in different directions), 
biological essentialism was unique to gender, whereby awareness increased essentialist 
attributions and increased system justification for gender.  
Discussion 
 In Study 3, I manipulate awareness and blindness ideologies, implementing the same 
paradigm used in the vast majority of research on race ideologies (see Wolsko et al., 2000; 2006; 
Gutiérrez & Unzueta, Richeson & Nussbaum, 2000; Vorauer, Gagnon & Sasaki, 2009; Sasaki & 
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Vorauer, 2013) to examine their effect on system justification for race and gender, as well as 
system-justifying rationales (denial of inequality for race, biological essentialism for gender). 
Indeed, I replicate past theory for race, whereby compared to blindness, race awareness seems to 
lessen denial of inequality and system justification. Adding to this literature, I show for the first 
time the opposite effect for gender, whereby the exact same ideological message that decreases 
system justification for race increased system justification for gender through a unique rationale: 
biological essentialism. As with Study 1, I show that while denial of inequality provides a 
system-justifying rationale for both race and gender, biological essentialism was unique to 
gender, whereby those exposed to awareness were more likely to endorse biological essentialism, 
which accounted for significant variance in system justification. Further, I show that exposure to 
these manipulations did not affect hostile prejudices, supporting the notion that they are 
benevolent ideologies. 
 Though I support my main predictions, there are several notable effects. For one, the 
control condition—which I hypothesize will be more in line with blindness for race and 
awareness for gender (as both ideologies support their respective status quo)—in most cases, fell 
in the middle of the two ideological manipulations. This may be due to the control prompt, 
whereby I had participants take a moment to reflect on “current race/gender issues in society.” In 
retrospect, having participants reflect on issues would most likely evoke awareness, perhaps 
confounding the control condition. I rectify this in the next study by having a neutral control 
condition (devoid of any race or gender content). Despite these non-significant differences, the 
control conditions were directionally more in line with race blindness and gender awareness on 
hypothesized variables (denial of inequality for race, essentialism for gender); thus, I meta-
analyze these effects at the end to examine comparisons across studies. Further, in this study, I 
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did not find support for gender ideologies affecting benevolent sexism, a role-based form of 
sexism shown to be related to system justification. It is unclear why the manipulations did not 
affect this form of sexism directly; however, unlike biological essentialism, which serves as a 
system-justifying rationale, manipulating awareness may not affect gender prejudices (explicit 
forms of sexism), but rather gender biases (role-based associations).  
 Importantly, this study demonstrated that ideologies can be manipulated, have divergent 
effects on unique system-justifying motives, and differently support the status quo. In the next 
chapter, I examine the consequences of these ideologies on outcomes that have the potential to 
mitigate, and perhaps nullify, inequality. For both race and gender, I focus on outcomes related 
to the system-justifying rationales being affected, both shown to increase racial minorities’ and 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERSITY IDEOLOGIES FOR RACE AND 
GENDER EQUALITY 
 
 In Chapter 1, I showed that compared to their ideological counterparts, race awareness 
disrupts, and gender awareness promotes, system justification. Support for the status quo 
inevitably has consequences for race and gender outcomes (i.e., “opportunity outcomes”). Since 
the United States is not structured in a way that is fair or equitable, to create better social systems 
that support race and gender equality, it is important to change, evolve, and progress toward 
updated policies; however, system justification hinders this process, creates acquiescence, and 
stagnates progress (Kay & Zanna, 2009; Jost et al., 2009a). Indeed, system justification has been 
shown to limit racial minorities’ and women’s opportunities in a variety of ways (see Jost et al., 
2009a and Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004). Thus, by changing dominant groups’ endorsement of 
system-justifying rationales, and system justification overall, it may be possible to affect and 
improve outcomes aimed at achieving equality. 
In this chapter, I focus on this question, and examine how awareness and blindness 
ideologies affect opportunity outcomes that promote versus hinder race and gender equality. I 
focus on opportunity outcomes especially likely to be affected by the system-justifying rationales 
found in Chapter 1 (denial of inequality and biological essentialism). For race, ignoring systemic 
inequality, believing that success is solely an outcome of hard-work, and denying advantages and 
privileges, should lead people to resist policies aimed at structural changes that benefit racial 
minorities (i.e., affirmative action). In this chapter, I examine affirmative action as an outcome of 
interest for race, as this has been shown to be one of the most effective structural interventions to 
increase representation, success, and outcomes for racial minorities (Crosby, Iyer & Sincharoen, 
2006; Kalev, Dobbin & Kelley, 2006). For gender, endorsing the natural, functional, and 
biological aspects of gender should lead to legitimization and endorsement of social roles (i.e., 
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gender stereotyping). I examine endorsement of agency and communality stereotyping, as these 
gender stereotypes (where agency overlaps with leadership characteristics) have been shown to 
be strongly affected by biological essentialism, and argued to be the primary factor in the 
underrepresentation of women in domains of power (Heilman, 2001).  
Reducing Racial Inequality Through Affirmative Action 
I argue that since race blindness denies inequality and supports the status quo, it should 
lead people to avoid implementing policies and practices that change systems to benefit racial 
minorities, namely affirmative action. 
The Importance of Affirmative Action for Achieving Racial Equality 
Affirmative action is the devotion of resources toward policies, practices, and programs 
that produce changes in organizational structures in attempts to increase the representation of 
underrepresented groups (Chambers, Clydesdale, Kidder, & Lempert, 2005; Parker, Baltes & 
Christiansen, 1997). Affirmative action can take several forms such as setting hiring and 
promotion goals, implementing recruiting efforts, and tracking personnel decisions (Cox, 1993; 
Crosby et al, 2006). Affirmative action plays an important role in reducing racial inequalities 
(Crosby et al., 2006; Kalev et al., 2006) and, compared to other efforts to increase representation 
(e.g., diversity training, mentoring programs), is one of the most effective strategies in reducing 
such disparities (Leonard, 1990; Kalev et al., 2006). Many have argued that affirmative action is 
necessary to assure the diversity of student bodies and workforces (Miller 1997), with some 
going as far to say that universities cannot achieve ethnic diversity without it (Kane 2003). For 
example, in some years, affirmative action has doubled the number of Black applicants to elite 
colleges (Chambers et al., 2005) and, over the past 30 years, has increased the number of Black 
male employees at 708 public sector organizations (Kalev et al., 2006). Further, affirmative 
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action benefits African American communities overall. For example, ethnic minority alumni of 
these programs were more likely to engage in civic engagement, provide services to inner cities, 
serve poor communities, and inspire other underrepresented youth (Lempert, Chambers, & 
Adams, 2000; Sinkford & Valachovic, 2003; Fryer et al., 2001). 
System-Justifying Rationales Used to Oppose Affirmative Action 
It is clear affirmative action is an important variable in reducing racial inequality; 
however, many are opposed to these policies (Thernstrom & Thernstrom 1997, Zuriff, 2004). 
Past work suggests that those who reject these policies do so for several reasons and using 
system-justifying rationales to support their opposition. For one, opponents see this policy as 
being unfair, and violating the value of meritocracy, basing selection decisions on demographic 
characteristics at the expense of ability and achievement (Thernstrom & Thernstrom 1997, Zuriff 
2004). Others choose to deny discrimination, believing these policies are unnecessary because 
African Americans already have an equal opportunity for success. Indeed, even very liberal 
people (who are predisposed to acknowledge discrimination) are unable to detect (and therefore 
deny) discrimination when they encounter injustices (Crosby et al., 2006). Additionally, 
dominant groups often choose to deny their privilege, as they wish to preserve the illusion of 
having legitimately earned their outcomes and fail to acknowledge the structural advantages they 
have received (Pelham & Hetts, 2001). Indeed, when exposed to their privilege, Whites anchor 
on their hardships, denying any special, or unearned, opportunities they are afforded on the basis 
of their skin color (Branscombe, 1998; Phillips & Lowery, 2015). 
System Justification and Resistance toward Affirmative Action 
As Crosby and colleagues (2006) argue, denial of race discrimination allows individuals 
to justify the status quo (system-justify), see the world as fair, and is therefore used as a 
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mechanism to reject affirmative action. That is, by supporting ideals of meritocracy, ignoring 
discrimination, and denying their privilege, Whites can feel comfortable with the current status 
quo, endorsing the current way society is structured (Crosby et al., 2006). Indeed, past work has 
found that those who endorse greater system-justifying beliefs are also less likely to support 
affirmative action (Jost & Thompson, 2000; Federico & Sidanius, 2000). Since I have shown that 
race blindness is likely to lead to denial of inequality and system justification, it is likely it will 
also lead to more resistance toward affirmative action.  
Race Blindness and Resistance toward Affirmative Action 
Past work has demonstrated that race blindness serves as an ideology that allows Whites 
to ignore inequality and resist affirmative action, especially amongst those low in prejudice (with 
benevolent attitudes toward Blacks; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner & Drout, 1994; 
Mazzocco et al., 2011; Wolsko et al., 2006). For example, Mazzocco and colleagues (2011) 
found that high-prejudice Whites resisted affirmative action no matter which ideology they were 
exposed to, but for low-prejudice Whites, race blindness fulfilled a desire to hold beliefs 
consistent with current racial realities, and led them to resist affirmative action policies. 
Similarly, Wolsko and colleagues (2006) found that Whites who endorsed race awareness were 
more likely to support affirmative action policies and recognize factors that affected racial 
minorities’ opportunities in society. In line with these findings, I argue that race awareness will 
lead to more support for affirmative action, as it allows Whites to recognize inequality (therefore 
problems with the system), encouraging them to take action to rectify it.    
Hypothesis 3a: Endorsement of race awareness will be positively related to support for 
affirmative action.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: Denial of inequality will mediate the relationship between race 
awareness and endorsement of affirmative action, such that race awareness will lessen 
denial of inequality, which in turn, will increase support for affirmative action policies.  
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Reducing Gender Inequality through Stereotype Reduction 
 
The Importance of Stereotype Reduction for Gender Equality 
 
I argue that since gender awareness exacerbates natural, biological attributions for gender 
differences, it should lead people to endorse gender stereotypes, which limit women’s 
opportunities by associating men (not women) with qualities necessary for leadership potential 
and success. Stereotypes are cognitive structures that associate entities with one another, often 
groups of people with certain characteristics; stereotyping is the application of these 
characteristics onto certain groups (Devine, 1989; Fiske, 1998). Stereotypes can be both positive 
and negative as well as conscious and unconscious (Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2000). 
Specific to gender, traditional stereotypes for men and women are complementary, and stem 
from different historically grounded social roles (i.e., gender roles; Eagly, 1987; 1997; 2013), 
where men took on tasks involving agency (e.g., hunting, defending) and women took on tasks 
involving communality (e.g., gathering, child-rearing). These roles created divergent stereotypes 
about men and women: men are seen as more agentic (e.g., assertive) and strategic (e.g., logical) 
and women are seen as more communal (e.g., warm) and empathetic (Eagly, 1997).  
Such gender stereotypes, which associate men with agency and women with 
communality, are detrimental to women’s career outcomes, even being called the primary cause 
of women’s underrepresentation in domains of power (Heilman, 2001; p., 657). Although both 
agency and communality stereotypes are valued, agency is in line with qualities valued in and 
expected of leaders (i.e., assertiveness, independence), whereas communality is often not (i.e., 
gentleness, sensitivity; Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001). Since agency overlaps with the 
male social role but not the female social role, it creates the expectation that men will be more 
likely to possess valued skills required for occupational success (Eagly & Karau, 2002) creating 
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a “lack of fit” for women in many workplace contexts (Heilman, 1983; 2001). 
 Not only are women perceived as ‘lacking fit’ for leadership positions, but they are 
evaluated less favorably when they enact leadership behaviors (Heilman & Eagly, 2008; Eagly & 
Karau, 2002). Decades of research have shown that lack of fit between women and leadership 
causes the devaluation of performance, denial of credit, and interpersonal exclusion (Heilman, 
2001; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs & Tamkins, 2004; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). For example, the 
perceived “lack-of-fit” between female stereotypes and managerial requirements is related to 
lower performance ratings of women compared to men (Lyness & Heilman, 2006). Other 
research has found that women get less credit than men for performance, due to perceived 
incongruence between women and agency stereotypes (e.g., competence, leadership qualities; 
Heilman & Haynes, 2005). Finally, those who endorse gender stereotypes are more likely to 
penalize women who enact agentic behavior, being less likely to like, hire, and promote women, 
and more likely to sabotage, ostracize, and undermine agentic women (Heilman et al., 2004; 
Rudman & Phelan, 2008).  
System-Justifying Rationales for Endorsing Gender Stereotypes 
 Due to the biological foundations of these gender stereotypes, where men’s greater 
strength made them suited for agentic roles, while women’s child-bearing ability made them 
suited for communal ones (Eagly, 1997; Wood & Eagly, 2012), these role-based stereotypes are 
seen as natural, being accepted, salient, and explicitly endorsed (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; 
Wood & Eagly, 2012). Indeed, biological essentialism is a large driver of stereotype 
endorsement (Brescoll et al., 2013; Levy et al., 1998; Dweck, Chui & Hong, 1995). Those who 
believe traits are shaped by biological sources exaggerate differences between groups (Rothbart 
& Taylor, 1992), endorse stereotypes more strongly (Levy et al., 1998), display greater prejudice 
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toward out-groups (Keller, 2005), and allot greater penalty for stereotype violators (Dweck et al., 
1995). Specific to gender, biological attributions have been linked to greater gender stereotyping 
(Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004), prejudice against women (Keller, 2005), and preference for male 
leaders (Hoyt & Burnette, 2013). This is problematic for reducing inequality as believing men’s 
greater agency is due to innate, biological factors implies that these differences are inevitable 
facts that are unlikely to change (Bem, 1993), confining men and women to different roles and 
limiting women’s opportunities in masculine domains. Thus, attributing gender differences to 
natural causes allows individuals to endorse and reinforce the power structure, where men are 
overrepresented and women are underrepresented in positions of power and influence (Brescoll 
et al., 2013).  
System Justification and Endorsement of Gender Stereotypes 
 Past work (and Chapter 1 in this dissertation) has shown that gender essentialism is a 
system-justifying ideology (Brescoll et al., 2013; Kray et al., 2017; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). For 
example, people who endorse gender essentialism also endorse system justification, by seeing 
the gender hierarchy as legitimate, unchangeable, and stable (Kray et al., 2017). Further, under 
system threat, individuals are more likely to endorse biological attributions for difference, to 
reduce uncertainty, anxiety, and reaffirm the status quo (Brescoll et al., 2013). Similarly, when 
the system is seen as inevitable and stable, individuals are more likely to attribute gender 
inequality as due to genuine differences between the sexes, rather than societal unfairness 
(Laurin, Shepherd & Kay, 2010). Reciprocally, those who endorse social role stereotype are also 
more likely to rationalize inequality between men and women (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). Further, 
political conservatives (those resistant to equality and change) are more likely to endorse gender 
essentialism (Brescoll & LaFrance, 2004; Keller, 2005). Since I have shown that gender 
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awareness is likely to lead to biological essentialism and system justification, it is likely gender 
awareness will also lead to more gender stereotyping.  
Gender Awareness and Endorsement of Gender Stereotypes 
Related to awareness ideologies, recent research has shown that gender awareness serves 
as an ideology that reifies and rationalizes gender stereotypes. For example, Martin and 
colleagues find that men who endorse, or are exposed to, gender awareness exhibit more gender 
stereotyping, specifically on stereotypes involving agency and STEM (science, technology, 
engineering, and math) dimensions (Martin & Phillips, 2018; Martin et al., 2018). Further, when 
men were exposed to a gender-aware ideology they exhibited more gender-bias, being less likely 
to hire an agentic female candidate and less likely to desire friendships with female peers. In 
Additionally, men who endorsed gender awareness were also more likely to exhibit backlash 
(social and economic penalties) against a dominant female leader, as well as dominate an 
interaction, being less open and receptive to ideas (Martin et al., 2018). Other work has shown 
that gender awareness led men to believe a female target was less qualified for STEM fields, 
giving her lower ratings on her potential success (Martin & Phillips, 2018). Finally, gender 
awareness relates to expectations for women to conform to feminine behaviors at work (Hahn et 
al., 2015). Together, this research suggests that gender awareness has consequences for men’s 
views of women, as well women’s opportunities. Thus, I hypothesize that gender awareness will 
lead to more gender stereotyping, especially on agentic (leadership) dimensions, as awareness 
rationalizes gender differences as being natural, biological, and inevitable (the status quo). 
Hypothesis 4a: Endorsement of gender awareness will be positively related to gender 
stereotyping.   
 
Hypothesis 4b: Biological essentialism will mediate the relationship between gender 
awareness and endorsement of gender stereotypes, such that gender awareness will lead 
to more biological essentialism, which in turn will increase gender stereotyping.  
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Study 4: The Effects of Awareness and Blindness on Opportunity Outcomes 
 
In Studies 1 and 3, I demonstrated that for race, the types of differences being suppressed 
through race blindness are based on opportunity and the purpose for doing so is to maintain 
(deny) inequality. In Study 4, I aim to show that awareness should expose the different 
opportunities Blacks are afforded (through less denial of inequality), which should increase 
Whites’ propensity to support policies aimed at creating a more egalitarian society (i.e., 
affirmative action). In contrast, for gender, I demonstrated that the types of differences 
individuals embrace through awareness are biological, natural, and essential differences, and the 
purpose of embracing such differences is to legitimize gender role occupational segregation (and 
therefore the gender hierarchy). Thus, I aim to show that gender awareness should reinforce and 
reify gender stereotypes in workplace capabilities (agency, occupational success) and legitimize 
their inexorable nature through greater biological attributions. For both race and gender, I 
examine how awareness differentially acts on unique system-justifying rationales (denial of 
inequality and essentialism) and affects different opportunity outcomes (attitudes toward 
affirmative action and stereotyping). 
To test these hypotheses, four hundred and twenty-six White male MTurk participants 
(non-overlapping with Study 3) were recruited to complete a two-part study on “Evaluating Press 
Releases” and “Attitudes and Opinions.” This paradigm was taken from past work (Martin & 
Phillips, 2017; Martin & Phillips, 2018), where participants were told that the study was 
interested in 1) evaluating their interest in academic research and 2) examining attitudes and 
opinions. A total of fifty participants were excluded from analysis, again, 45 participants who 
rejected the ideological message (10%), and five participants who failed a manipulation check, 
asking what social category they were asked to answer questions about. The final sample 
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consisted of 376 White men (Mage = 37.76; SD = 12.46; Mwork = 16.0; SD = 7.77; 58% had a 
bachelor’s degree or more education).  
In the first part of the study, participants were given a list of eight possible press releases that 
they could receive and then were asked to evaluate an article (with content from the Wolsko, 
2000, and Study 3 prompts) that either espoused the merits of an awareness versus blindness 
approach for achieving either race versus gender equality (from Malicke, 2013, and Martin & 
Phillips, 2017), or a control article discussing the utility of “big data,” which was used in both 
the race and gender conditions (see Appendix C for all articles). Thus, this study used a 2 (social 
category: race vs. gender) x 3 (ideology: aware vs. blind vs. control) between-subjects design. 
After reading the article, participants answered questions about their interest in the research and 
the quality of the press release. Participants then moved on to Part 2 of the study, where they 
answered questions about their attitudes and opinions about either race or gender, filling out 
scales related to system justification, biological essentialism, denial of inequality, stereotypes, 
and attitudes toward affirmative action. After answering these questions, participants were 
debriefed, thanked, and paid.  
Dependent Variables  
Manipulation check. Participants filled out the awareness measure used in Studies 1–3, 
rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .82). 
 System justification. Participants completed the system justification measure used in the 
studies thus far (Kay & Jost, 2003) on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a 
= .91). 
 System-justifying rationales.  
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 Denial of inequality.8 Participants completed the denial of inequality scale (denial of 
discrimination/privilege) used in Study 3 (Swim et al., 1995; Swim & Miller, 1999 a = .94), 
rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree.  
Biological essentialism. Participants filled out the biological essentialism measure used in 
the studies thus far (Coleman & Hong, 2008), rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .84). 
 Opportunity outcomes. 
Attitudes toward affirmative action. I examine attitudes toward affirmative action using 
six items from Jost and Thompson (2000) and Murrell et al. (1994), on a scale from 1 = strongly 
agree to 7 = strongly disagree (a = .88). An example includes, “Because of past discrimination, 
[Black people] [women] should be given preference in hiring and promotion.” See Appendix A 
for all items used. 
Stereotypes. As with Study 1, I examine different stereotypes in the race and gender 
conditions, whereby I analyze stereotypes surrounding agency and communality in the gender 
conditions and stereotypes involving positive and negative cultural associations in the race 
conditions. Although all stereotypes were presented in both race and gender conditions, the 
reliability of cultural stereotypes was not acceptable in the gender conditions (a = -.12; for 
example, religious and athletic are more characteristic of Blacks; whereas, religious is more 
characteristic of women and athletic is more characteristic of men). Further, the reliability of the 
gender stereotypes was not acceptable in the race condition (a = .25; i.e., warm is seen as more 
                                                
8 Again, I included the symbolic prejudice scale (Sears, 1988; a = .82) and find the same pattern, F(2, 196) = 5.14, p 
= .007, ηp2 = .05, whereby those in the aware condition (M = 2.15, SD = .57) endorsed symbolic prejudice 
marginally (p = .068), and significantly (p = .002), less than those in the blind (M = 2.36, SD = .63) and control (M = 
2.49, SD = .64) conditions, respectively. Again, the control did not differ from the blind condition (p = .19) 
suggesting that the baseline for symbolic prejudice is more in line with race-blind than race-aware. 
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characteristic of women, and leader-like is seen as more characteristic of men; whereas both 
warm and leader-like are seen as more characteristic of Whites). 
 Gender stereotypes. For gender stereotypes, I presented ten stereotypes: six masculine 
(independent, competitive, leader-like, dominant, competitive, analytic; a = .70) and four 
feminine (sympathetic, warm, gentle, kind; a = .87) on a scale from 1 = much more 
characteristic of women to 5 = much more characteristic of men (poles counterbalanced; 
Diekman & Eagly, 2000). Feminine stereotypes were reversed, such that higher scores represent 
more traditional stereotyping (a = .84). 
 Cultural stereotypes. For race cultural stereotypes, I presented six stereotypes, three 
positive (religious, athletic, rhythmic; a = .64) and three negative (uneducated, poor, threatening; 
a = .76). Stereotypes were measured on a scale from 1 = much more characteristic of Whites to 5 
= much more characteristic of Blacks (poles counterbalanced). Cultural stereotypes are scored 
such that higher scores represent more traditional stereotyping (a = .75). 
Results 
Analysis Strategy and Expected Results 
As with Study 3, I analyze results using a 2 (social category: race vs. gender) x 3 
(ideology: aware vs. blind vs. control) ANOVA. Aside from the manipulation check, where I 
expected a main effect of ideological condition, I expected to find significant 2 (social category) 
x 3 (ideology) interactions on the dependent variables of interest. Further, again, since I argue 
that blindness and awareness are system-justifying ideologies for race and gender respectively, I 
expect the control condition to be more in line with blindness in the race condition and 
awareness in the gender condition. See Table 5 for correlations between variables within each 
condition. 
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Manipulation Check 
 Unlike Study 3, in this study, I find a significant effect of social category, F(1, 370) = 
8.23, p = .004, ηp2 = .022, where overall, individuals endorsed awareness less in the race 
condition (M = 4.15, SD = .94) compared to the gender condition (M = 4.41, SD = 1.00). As 
expected, I find a main effect of ideology, F(2, 370) = 47.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .20, and no 
significant interaction (p = .98). That is, across both the race and gender conditions, those in the 
awareness condition (M = 4.83, SD = .88) endorsed an awareness ideology significantly more 
than those in the blindness condition (M = 3.75, SD = .94), t(370) = 9.70, d = 1.19, p < .001. 
Notably, the control condition (M = 4.26, SD = .80) fell between (and significantly differed from 
both) the awareness, t(370) = -5.23, d = -.68, p < .001, and the blindness, t(370) = 4.77, d = .58, 
p < .001, conditions, suggesting that the awareness manipulation brought participants up from 
the baseline, whereas the blindness condition brought people down from the baseline. See Table 
6 for comparisons across social category conditions.    
System Justification 
 I find no significant effect of social category (p = .62) or ideology (p = .44) on system 
justification; however, supporting Hypotheses 1-2a, I find a significant 2 (social category) x 3 
(ideology) interaction, F(2, 370) = 5.06, p = .007, ηp2 = .027. In the race condition, those who 
were exposed to the awareness message (M = 3.56, SD = 1.33) endorsed system justification 
significantly less than those in the blindness (M = 4.07, SD = 1.37) condition, t(1, 370) = -2.15, d 
= -.38, p = .032, and the control condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.36), t(1, 370) = -2.53, d = -.43, p = 
.012. The control condition did not differ from the race-blind condition (p = .77), suggesting that 
the baseline was more similar to race-blind than race-aware. In the gender condition, I find the 
reverse pattern, where those exposed to the gender-aware message endorsed system justification 
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significantly more (M = 4.10, SD = 1.34) than those exposed to the gender-blind message (M = 
3.57, SD = 1.26), t(1, 370) = 2.14, d = .41, p = .033. The control condition fell between the two 
(M = 3.88, SD = 1.27), differing from neither the aware (p = .37) nor the blind condition (p = 
.20). See Table 6 and Figure 5a. 
System-Justifying Rationales 
Denial of inequality. There was no significant effect of social category (p = .45), or 
ideological condition (p = .17) on denial of inequality. However, there was a significant social 
category x ideology condition interaction, F(2, 370) = 7.66, p = .001, ηp2 = .040. Supporting 
Hypothesis 1b, for race, those in the awareness condition (M = 3.00, SD = 1.32) endorsed denial 
of inequality significantly less than those in the blind (M = 3.62, SD = 1.44), t(370) = -2.59, d = -
.45, p = .01, and control (M = 3.87, SD = 1.44), t(370) = -3.81, d = -.63, p < .001, conditions. 
There was no difference between the blind and control conditions (p = .26), suggesting that the 
baseline for denial of inequality is more in line with race-blind. In contrast, gender ideologies did 
not act as strongly on denial of inequality, where there were no significant contrasts (p’s > .19) 
between conditions (Maware = 3.79, SD = 1.30; Mblind = 3.47, SD = 1.12; Mcontrol = 3.54, SD = 
1.30). See Table 6 and Figure 5b. 
Essentialism. I find a significant effect of social category, F(1, 370) = 35.77, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .088, on biological essentialism. In line with my hypotheses about gender being more 
essentialized than race, participants endorsed gender essentialism (M = 4.33, SD = 1.15) more 
than race essentialism (M = 3.64, SD = 1.14). Although there was a significant main effect of 
ideology (p = .006), this main effect was qualified by a marginal interaction, F(2, 370) = 2.40, p 
= .092, ηp2 = .013. That is, there were no significant differences in endorsement of essentialism in 
the race condition between aware (M = 3.64, SD = 1.23), blind, (M = 3.48, SD = 1.01), and 
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control (M = 3.77, SD = 1.16) conditions (all p’s > .13). In contrast, and supporting Hypothesis 
2b, in the gender conditions, those in the awareness condition (M = 4.70, SD = .96) endorsed 
gender essentialism significantly more than those in the blindness condition (M = 3.96, SD = 
1.18), t(370) = 3.53, d = .69, p < .001. The control condition fell in the middle (M = 4.32, SD = 
1.18), where participants endorsed gender essentialism marginally less than those in the 
awareness condition, t(370) = -1.85, d = -.35, p = .065, and marginally more than those in the 
blindness condition, t(370) = 1.75 d = .31, p = .081. See Table 6 and Figure 5c. 
Opportunity Outcomes 
Attitudes toward affirmative action. For attitudes toward affirmative action, I find no 
significant effect of social category (p = .25) or ideological condition (p = .076). As expected I 
find a significant interaction, F(2, 370) = 3.86, p = .022, ηp2 = .020. Supporting Hypothesis 3a, in 
the race condition, those in the awareness condition endorsed more positive attitudes toward 
affirmative action (M = 3.89, SD = 1.37) than those in the blind condition (M = 3.30, SD = 1.46), 
t(370) = 2.45, d = .42, p = .015, and control (M = 3.07, SD = 1.39), t(370) = 3.54, d = .59, p < 
.001. The control and blind did not differ from one another (p = .32), again suggesting that 
baseline attitudes toward affirmative action are more in line with race blindness than race 
awareness. In the gender conditions, there were no significant differences between conditions 
(p’s > .45; Maware =3.50, SD = 1.32, Mblind = 3.69, SD = 1.18, Mcontrol = 3.55, SD = 1.30). See 
Table 6 and Figure 5d. 
Stereotyping 
 Gender. For gender stereotypes, supporting Hypothesis 4a, I find a significant interaction 
between ideological conditions, F(2, 174) = 3.14, p = .046, ηp2 = .034, such that those in the 
gender-blind condition, (M = 3.41, SD = .45), endorsed gender stereotypes significantly less, 
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t(174) = -2.26, d = -.45, p = .025, than those in the gender-aware (M = 3.61, SD = .44), or control 
condition (M = 3.59, SD = .48), t(174) = -2.08, d = -.39 p = .039. The control and aware 
conditions did not differ from one another (p = .82), suggesting that blindness induced people to 
stereotype less. These effects were particularly driven by agency (masculine) stereotyping, F(2, 
174) = 4.16, p = .017, ηp2 = .046, whereby individuals in the blind condition, (M = 3.31, SD = 
.39), endorsed agency stereotypes significantly less than those in the aware (M = 3.50, SD = .37), 
t(174) = -2.40, d = -.50, p = .018, and control, (M = 3.51, SD = .48), t(174) =-2.59, d = .46, p = 
.01. Again, the control and aware conditions did not differ from one another (p = .89). There 
were no differences between endorsement of feminine stereotypes (p = .25), and no significant 
differences between conditions (Mblind = 3.57, SD = .66; Maware = 3.77, SD = .71; Mcontrol = 3.71, 
SD = .64; p’s > .10).  
 Race. For cultural stereotypes, I find no significant differences for overall, F(2, 196) = 
1.84, p = .16, ηp2 = .018, positive, F(2, 196) = .94, p = .39, ηp2 = .009, or negative, F(2, 196) = 
1.92, p = .15, ηp2 = .019, stereotyping by condition, with no significant contrasts between blind 
and aware conditions (p’s > .47), or conditions overall (p’s > .06). See Table 6 for means and 
contrasts. 
Moderated Mediations 
 I again sought to examine how essentialism and modern prejudice differentially provide 
rationale to justify the status quo, examining Hypotheses 1c and 2c. I again ran two moderated 
mediations using PROCESS Model 8 (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008), use an indirect 
effect of the highest order product term to infer whether the moderation is mediated, and 
predicted that I would find divergent effects of awareness on system justification, through 
different mechanisms. For race, participants should use denial of inequality as a system-
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justifying mechanism; whereas for gender, participants should use biological essentialism as a 
system-justifying mechanism.  
Supporting Hypothesis 1c, for the moderated mediation through denial of inequality, I 
find a significant highest order interaction, indirect effect = -.40, SE = .16, CI95 = -.74, -.12, 
whereby at the value of race, there is a significant indirect effect of awareness on system 
justification through denial of inequality, indirect effect = .27, SE = .11, CI95 = .06, .51, but no 
indirect effect at the value of gender, indirect effect = -.14, SE = .10, CI95 = -.35, .05. Further, 
supporting Hypothesis 2c, for the moderated mediation through essentialism, I again find a 
significant highest order interaction, indirect effect = -.16, SE = .10, CI95 = -.40, -.004, whereby 
at the value of race, there was no significant indirect effect through essentialism, indirect effect = 
-.04, SE = .06, CI95 = -.17, .07, but in line with my hypotheses, at the value of gender, I find a 
significant indirect effect of awareness on system justification through essentialism, indirect 
effect = -.21, SE = .09, CI95 = -.41, -.06.9  
Further, to test hypothesis 3b and 4b, I examined how awareness promotes (or reduces) 
system-justifying rationales, which in turn affects opportunity outcomes, both of which are 
unique to race and gender. For the moderated mediation, examining the indirect effect of 
awareness (IV) on support of affirmative action (DV), through denial of inequality (Med), as a 
function of social category (Mod), I find a significant highest order interaction, indirect effect = 
.59, SE = .22, CI95 = .18, 1.05, whereby there at the value of race, there is a significant indirect 
effect of awareness on support for affirmative action through denial of inequality, indirect effect 
                                                
9 I also examined the serial relationships between awareness à system-justifying rationale à system justification à 
opportunity outcomes, using PROCESS Model 6 (5000 bootstraps; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). For both race 
(awareness à modern prejudice à system justification à affirmative action) and gender (awareness à 
essentialism à system justification à stereotyping), neither model was significant (race: indirect effect = .02, SE = 
.03, CI95 = -.02, .09; gender: indirect effect = .01, SE = .01, CI95 = -.001, .04). However, this was likely because the 
direct mediation of denial of inequality on affirmative action for race, and essentialism on stereotyping for gender, 
provided better model fits. 
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= -.39, SE = .16, CI95 = -.70, -.08, but no indirect effect at the value of gender, indirect effect = 
.20, SE = .14, CI95 = -.07, .49. See Figure 6a. In contrast, for the moderated mediation examining 
the indirect effect of awareness (IV) on stereotyping (DV), through essentialism (Med), as a 
function of social category (Mod), I find a significant highest-order interaction, indirect effect = -
.05, SE = .03, CI95 = -.11, -.002, whereby I find at the value of gender, there is a significant 
indirect effect between awareness on stereotyping through essentialism, indirect effect = -.05, SE 
= .09, CI95 = -.22, .12, but no indirect effect at the value of race, indirect effect = -.07, SE = .03, 
CI95 = -.12, -.02. See Figure 6b. These results support my hypotheses (3b and 4b) that for race, 
awareness leads to less denial of inequality, which produces more support for affirmative action; 
whereas for gender, awareness led to more essentialism and produced more gender stereotyping.  
Discussion 
 In Study 4, I replicate the findings from my previous studies, whereby I show that for 
race, an awareness ideology decreases denial of inequality (a system-justifying rationale) and 
subsequently leads to less support for the status quo (system justification). In contrast, for 
gender, awareness increases biological attributions for gender differences, thereby increasing 
support for the status quo. Further, I show the importance of these rationales and endorsement of 
system justification, whereby awareness and blindness ideologies have implications for 
opportunity outcomes that affect race and female representation in positions of power: attitudes 
toward affirmative action and stereotyping, respectively. That is, awareness ideologies for race 
increase out-group participants’ support for policies that disrupt the status quo and provide 
solutions to inequality (Crosby et al., 2006). In contrast, awareness ideologies heightened 
traditional gender stereotyping, which has been shown to be one of the greatest barriers to 
women’s representation in positions of power (Heilman, 2001). Further, in line with theory, the 
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effect of gender awareness is particularly consequential for agency stereotyping, which is more 
problematic, as these are the qualities that overlap with leadership and most important for 
women’s success in occupational domains (Eagly & Karau, 2002). 
 Rectifying issues with my control conditions from the previous study, I find that the 
baseline for most effects are consistent with my ideology status quo argument, whereby for race 
the control condition was more similar to the blind condition (system justification, denial of 
inequality, attitudes toward affirmative action), and for gender the control condition was more 
similar to the awareness condition (essentialism, stereotyping). I meta-analyze these effects after 
Study 7 to glean more information about movement from the control condition across studies.  
 Further, I find a parsimonious system-justifying rationale for racial ideologies, whereby 
race ideologies specifically act upon denial of inequality and not essentialism. In this study, I 
find an exclusive explanation for gender ideologies as well, where unlike Studies 1 and 3, gender 
ideologies did not act on denial of inequality. This is consistent with my arguments: assuming 
gender differences are natural and essential can heighten denial of inequality, but that gender 
essentialism provides a stronger system-justifying rationale for gender awareness.  
Finally, in this study, by affecting opportunity outcomes that significantly affect racial 
minorities’ and women’s potential for success, I show the potential of awareness and blindness 
ideologies to intervene on race and gender inequality, providing a practical solution to achieving 
greater equity for racial minorities and women. Further, I show the importance and power 
potential of media messages on individual’s beliefs about, and support for, the status quo, as well 
as outcomes geared toward maintaining or disrupting inequality (affirmative action, 
stereotyping). My manipulations were ostensibly media releases about how to achieve equality 
and affected participants’ race and gender beliefs, showing the importance for mass media to use 
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caution in espousing or supporting one ideology over the other. Indeed, much popular press and 
mass media argue both for and against either ideology (Eagly, 1995; Krawcheck, 2017). This 
study shows the importance of being discerning around espousing ideologies to the mass public.  
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CHAPTER 4: SHIFTING ATTRIBUTIONS TO LEVERAGE AWARENESS 
In this next chapter, I propose that shifting the types of differences upon which diversity 
ideologies intervene can produce similar outcomes for race and gender relations. By directing the 
types of differences out-group members focus on away from internal sources, and toward 
external sources, I argue that an awareness ideology can be utilized as an adaptive intervention 
for both race and gender relations.  
In the past four studies, I have suggested that it is not diversity ideologies themselves that 
have negative consequences for race and gender equality, but rather it is the types of differences 
upon which they act. Since diversity ideologies are often devoid of any content—not necessarily 
suggesting which differences we be aware of or blind to—I argue that shifting the types of 
differences being focused on toward external, experiential, and systemic differences should 
render awareness an effective strategy for both race and gender. That is, since the types of 
differences individuals naturally focus on for gender are system-justifying differences in biology 
and social roles, focusing diversity ideologies on the types of differences that render awareness 
an effective ideology for race (opportunity, experiential) should not only lessen denial of 
inequality and increase support for affirmative action (outcomes associated with acknowledging 
external factors), but lessen essential, biological beliefs about gender (thereby reducing gender 
stereotyping). 
As noted, biological essentialism leads to a host of detrimental consequences for women 
as well as many other social groups (Brescoll et al., 2013; Dweck et al., 1995; Williams & 
Eberhardt, 2008). This is especially problematic for gender inequality, as gender is the most 
essentialized category (Prentice & Miller, 2006) and people often make greater biological 
attributions for gender differences than opportunity attributions (Martin & Parker, 1995). Past 
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work has found that when no external attribution is given, many people anchor on internal 
factors to explain behavior (Ross, 1977; Hamilton, 1998). Thus, it not surprising that when told 
to be “aware” of gender differences, through gender awareness, individuals anchor on biological 
explanations for difference.  
However, there is potential for these views to be shifted. Much past work has shown that 
subtle differences in framing, labels, attributions, and rationales can have a significant effect on 
the way individuals interpret information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984; Levin & Gaeth, 1988; Hall, Phillips & Townsend, 2015). Thus, anchoring individuals on 
external, experiential, and opportunity differences, rather than biological, essential differences 
may have the potential to redirect attributions for gender differences, and therefore leverage the 
potential benefits of gender awareness.  
Indeed, past work has found that the messages and information used to explain the source 
of intergroup differences have important consequences for intergroup relations. For example, 
using ostensible newspaper articles, Williams and Eberhardt (2008) found that participants were 
more likely to desire cross-race friendships when reading about the sociocultural factors for 
racial differences compared to biological ones (Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). Further, after 
reading fictitious articles about traits being malleable (incremental), compared to fixed (entity), 
participants were less likely to stereotype out-group members (Levy et al., 1998). Using the same 
articles, Tadmor and her colleagues (2013) showed that those who read incremental articles not 
only endorsed race essentialism less than those who read entity articles, but also endorsed race 
essentialism less than those who were given no message at all. That is, giving participants 
messages about traits being malleable reduced their essentialist beliefs from their baseline levels. 
Similarly, Brescoll and LaFrance (2004) found that when participants read ostensible newspaper 
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articles about biological gender differences, they endorsed gender essentialism to the same extent 
as those who read no article at all (i.e., a control condition). However, by exposing participants 
to sociocultural explanations for differences, participants were significantly less likely to endorse 
gender essentialism.  
Thus, it seems clear that though biological and essentialized beliefs about women are 
internalized, they are clearly capable of being changed. In the last four studies, I have shown that 
gender awareness affects participants’ endorsement of biological essentialism, suggesting the 
types of differences gender ideologies act upon are biological ones. However, promoting 
awareness of opportunity and experiential gender differences—the ones being evoked for race—
should produce similar effects to those of race, not only increasing recognition of systemic 
inequality and support for affirmative action policies (as found in the race conditions), but also 
reducing biological essentialism and stereotyping. Thus, in the next two studies, I provide a 
manipulation (“experience awareness”) redirecting the focus of awareness toward external 
differences.  
Supporting my theory, I expect that in the race conditions, since the types of differences 
are already focused on external attributions, there should be no differences between a race 
awareness and experience awareness manipulation. In the gender conditions, since I argue that 
gender awareness highlights internal (biological) gender differences, I expect experience 
awareness manipulations to have opposite effects. That is, redirecting undirected awareness 
away from internal differences and toward external factors, via experience awareness should 
lessen system justification and subsequent rationales and outcomes and have similar effects to 
gender blindness. 
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Importantly, the rationales and outcomes affected by the experience awareness 
manipulations are likely to be related to external factors, such as denial of inequality and 
affirmative action. That is, making participants aware of external differences, whether for race or 
gender, should lead them to recognize external factors for inequality (lessen denial of inequality) 
and be motivated to support actions to rectify systemic problems (affirmative action). Though I 
also believe externally directed awareness will redirect differences away from internal factors 
(and thereby reduce biological essentialism and stereotyping), I believe this message will act 
more strongly on external rationales and outcomes.  
Hypothesis 5a: Compared to endorsement of a race-blind approach, endorsement of a 
race-aware and race- “experience aware” approach will be negatively related to system 
justification, denial of inequality, and opposition toward affirmative action. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Compared to endorsement of a gender-aware approach, endorsement of 
a gender-blind and gender- “experience aware” approach will be negatively related to 
system justification, denial of inequality, and opposition toward affirmative action. 
 
Study 5: Experience Awareness in an Organizational Setting 
In this study, I provide a preliminary test of my hypothesis that by directing the types of 
differences toward experiential ones, awareness has the potential to leverage positive benefits for 
both racial minorities and women. Supporting Hypotheses 5a and 5b I believed that when framed 
around differences in experiences, opportunities, and treatment, awareness (compared to 
blindness) ideologies would reduce system justification for both race and gender. To test this 
hypothesis, I partnered with an educational institution that was conducting a survey during its 
“Diversity and Inclusion” week. 
The context of this study was a large, private business school on the East Coast. The 
survey went out to the entire school and 1,137 students took part (approximately 80% of the 
students). To be consistent with the previous studies, I restricted the sample to United States 
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citizens and out-group members (Whites in the race condition and men in the gender condition). 
This left a remaining sample of 435 individuals. The race condition consisted of 231 Whites (136 
men, 91 women, 4 unidentified), with a mean age of 28.64 (SD = 2.81). The gender condition 
consisted of 204 men (137 Whites, 37 Asian, 10 Black, 7 Hispanic, and 13 Other Race), with a 
mean age of 27.76 (SD = 3.14). Participants were put in one of two experimental conditions, 
being asked about their views on either race or gender.  
Awareness of Experience Framing 
 To ensure participants directed attention toward differences in issues, experiences, and 
obstacles facing underrepresented groups, the survey included multiple messages directing 
attention toward these types of differences. For example, in the introduction participants were 
told that the survey aims to gather information to “address key issues facing students and 
determine actionable plans to improve and evolve students’ experience.” The email sent to 
students noted that the goal of the survey was to “understand and improve the different student 
experiences, with the goal of ensuring that all students can thrive academically, socially, and in 
their career pursuits” and told that topics of interest include “harassment, socioeconomic issues, 
privilege, amongst others.” These were meant to direct attention to the different experiences and 
issues facing women and racial minorities that affect their ability to achieve success in 
organizational environments. See Appendix D for excerpt.  
Independent Variable: Awareness Endorsement 
 To measure awareness, I gave participants the following prompt: “We are interested in 
your thoughts about the best ways to improve [race/ethnic] [gender] diversity at [our institution]. 
On one hand, [this institution] could focus on building common identity as MBAs that transcends 
[race] [gender]. Events and discussions could focus on the many similarities that bind us 
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together to make [our institution] more inclusive. On the other hand, [our institution] could focus 
on emphasizing race [gender] differences and highlight the unique perspectives these differences 
bring to the community. Events and discussions could focus on differences to make [this 
institution] more inclusive.” Participants were then asked, “to what extent do you think each 
strategy is more effective than the other” on a scale from 1 = focusing on common identity is 
much more effective – 7 = focusing on different identities is much more effective. Further, I asked 
participants which strategy they believed was more effective (binary variable). Results are 
consistent across both measures, but given the variance in beliefs, I analyze data using the scale 
measure. 
 Notably, supporting the notion that individuals often do not know the best ways to 
approach diversity, there was equal endorsement of awareness and blindness strategies, where 
neither scale was different from the midpoint in both the race, (M = 3.99, SD = 1.64), t(230) = -
.12, p = .90, and gender, (M = 3.84, SD = 1.69), t(203) = -1.37, p = .17, conditions. Further, 
individuals endorsed awareness and blindness ideologies equally across conditions, F(1, 433) = 
.87, p = .35, ηp2 = .002. Finally, these results are replicated when using a binary variable, where 
51% of individuals endorsed awareness, over blindness, in both the race and the gender 
conditions.  
Dependent Variables  
 System justification. To measure system justification, I adapted questions from the 
system justification measure to capture the extent to which participants were satisfied with the 
current state of diversity at their institution. Notably, both women and racial minorities are 
underrepresented at this institution with women representing 39% (versus 51% of national 
population), and racial minorities representing 32% (versus 41% of national population; U.S. 
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Census Bureau, 2017) of the institution’s population. Thus, believing that the institution is 
“diverse” and being “satisfied with diversity” should represent beliefs supporting the status quo 
regarding the current demographic representation of the institution. To capture these beliefs, 
participants were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the following 
statements: “[this institution] needs to be more diverse (reversed),” “[this institution] has a 
diverse student body,” “I am satisfied with diversity at [this institution],” on a scale from 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .80).  
Results 
I find no effect of social category condition (p = .16), but as expected I find a significant 
effect of awareness on system justification, B = -.16, SE = .034, t(432) = -4.76, p < .001, 
whereby the more people endorsed awareness, the less they endorsed system justification. There 
was no significant interaction (p =.58), whereby this effect occurred in both the race, B = -.14, 
SE = .048, t(431) = -3.03, p = .003, and the gender, B = -.18, SE = .049, t(431) = -3.71, p < .001, 
conditions. Further, these effects hold controlling for other demographic variables, such as 
gender (in race condition), race (in gender condition), age, political ideology, relationship status, 
tenure at school, and sexuality. See Table 7. 
Discussion 
In this study, I find that by framing awareness around experiential differences, the 
beneficial effects of awareness ideologies occur for both race and gender. That is, I find that both 
race and gender “experiential” awareness decreases support for the status quo. By testing this 
framing in an institutional setting, I provide evidence that reframing gender awareness around 
experience may lead to beneficial effects for diversity and inclusion. However, there were 
several limitations of this study. Due to the context of the study, I could not compare to an 
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awareness or blindness control condition, nor could I examine system-justifying rationales and 
opportunity outcomes. Thus, in the next two studies, I examine the effects of experience 
awareness on system justification, system-justifying rationales, and opportunity outcomes.  
Study 6: Directing Differences toward External Sources 
In this study, I test the hypothesis that the types of differences participants are made 
“aware of” explain the divergent effects of awareness on system justification, system-justifying 
rationales, and opportunity outcomes for race and gender. That is, since I argue that the types of 
differences participants are naturally made “aware of” through racial ideologies are already 
external ones, in the race conditions, directing participants to be aware of external differences 
should not differentially affect endorsement of system justification. On the other hand, since the 
types of differences participants are “aware of” through gender ideologies are internal, shifting 
the focus toward awareness of external differences should create similar outcomes to race 
awareness and lessen endorsement of system justification. 
In this study, I use the same paradigm as in Study 4, whereby 469 White male 
participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (non-overlapping with previous studies) were 
invited to take part in a study on “Reading and Comprehension” and “Attitudes and 
Perceptions.” However, in this study, along with the awareness and blindness messages used thus 
far, I added an experience awareness condition whereby the participants were told to focus on 
“external” differences for race and gender (differences in experiences, opportunities, and 
treatment). See Appendix E for all articles. Thus, I used a 2 (social category: race vs. gender) x 3 
(ideology: awareness vs. blindness vs. experience awareness) design. The prompts for the 
awareness and blindness manipulations were the same as those used in Study 5, and in the 
experience aware condition, participants read statements such as: 
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 We will be in a better position to advance as a society if we embrace that [racial groups] 
[men and women] have important differences in terms of their life experiences and 
opportunities. Each group has its own obstacles and experiences that differentially affect 
their lives, and by acknowledging these differences, we validate the identity of each 
group…There are indisputable differences between [ethnic groups] [men and women] 
and recognizing these differences in terms of their life experiences, opportunities, and 
obstacles can benefit both groups. 
 
Ninety-six (20%) of participants were excluded from analysis for disagreeing with the 
premise of the ideology they were given (and therefore, rejecting the ideology)10. Further, 16 
participants were removed for failing a manipulation check (asking which social category and 
ideology their article was about). This left a remaining sample of 357 White male participants 
(Mage = 36.76, SD = 11.95; Mwork = 15.20, SD = 8.05, 54% with bachelor’s degree or more 
education). Again, participants were recruited for what was ostensibly a two-part study on 1) 
“Evaluating Press Releases” and 2) “Attitudes and “Evaluations.” In the first part of the study, 
participants were given a list of eight possible press releases that they could receive and then 
asked to evaluate an article espousing the merits of an awareness versus blindness versus 
experience awareness approach, for achieving race versus gender equality. They then moved on 
to the second part of the study, where they were asked to answer questions about their attitudes 
and opinions, completing scales related to system justification, system-justifying rationales 
(denial of inequality and biological essentialism), and opportunity outcomes (attitudes toward 
affirmative action and stereotypes). After answering these questions, participants were debriefed, 
thanked, and paid.  
Dependent Variables 
Manipulation check. Participants filled out the awareness measure, rating their 
                                                
10 The number who rejected the article in this study is higher than previous studies; however, effects are consistent 
(and stronger) when solely using those who “strongly disagreed” with the ideological message (7%). Since I decided 
to use “strongly disagree” and “disagree” as exclusion a priori, I continue to use this exclusion criterion in this study.  
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endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .82). 
 System justification. Participants completed the system justification measure (Kay & 
Jost, 2003) on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .89). 
 System-justifying rationales. 
 Denial of inequality. Participants filled out the denial of discrimination/privilege 
measure, rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a 
= .95). 
Biological essentialism. Participants completed the biological essentialism measure, 
rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .84). 
 Opportunity outcomes. 
Attitudes toward affirmative action. I used the same items as in Study 4, where 
participants rated their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly disagree 
(a = .88).  
 Stereotypes. I use the same stereotypes as in Study 4 for gender (agency [a = .81], 
communality [a = .89], and overall [a = .89]); and race (positive cultural [a = .61], negative 
cultural [a = .65], and overall [a = .71]). Again, I only analyze gender stereotypes in the gender 
conditions and cultural stereotypes in the race conditions. 
Results 
Analysis Strategy 
 I use a 2 (social category: race vs. gender) x 3 (ideology: aware vs. blind vs. experience-
aware) interaction. I expect to replicate past effects in both the race and gender conditions, such 
that awareness (compared to blindness) will lead to less system justification, endorsement of 
system-justifying rationales in the race conditions, but more endorsement of system justification 
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and system-justifying rationales in the gender conditions. Further, I examine my hypotheses, and 
show that the types of differences affect system justification and subsequent outcomes, by 
comparing these effects to experience awareness. Since, for race, I argue that the types of 
differences being highlighted through awareness are already experiential, I hypothesize that 
compared to blindness, both awareness and experience awareness will lead to less system 
justification and endorsement of system-justifying rationales; whereas in the gender conditions, 
since I argue the types of differences being highlighted through awareness are internal, 
redirecting these differences toward external differences, through experience awareness, should 
lead to less system justification and endorsement of system-justifying rationales, and have 
similar outcomes as gender blindness. See Table 8 for correlations between variables within race 
and gender conditions. Means and contrasts for each condition can be found in Table 9. 
Manipulation Check 
I find no significant effect of social category (p = .07), and as expected, a significant 
effect of ideology, F(2, 351) = 66.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .27, such that overall, those in the blind 
condition (M = 3.72, SD = .94) endorsed an awareness ideology less than those in the aware (M = 
4.81, SD = .87), t(351) = 10.48, d = 1.20, p < .001, and experience-aware (M = 4.71, SD = .71), 
t(487) = 9.46, d = 1.19, p < .001, conditions. The aware and experience-aware conditions did not 
significantly differ from one another (p = .29), suggesting that the experience-aware 
manipulation had its intended effect and led participants to endorse an “awareness” ideology. 
There was also a significant social category x ideology interaction, F(2, 351) = 8.59, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .052, whereby the differences in awareness endorsement between ideological conditions 
was less polarized in the race conditions (Maware = 4.58, SD = .79; Mblind = 3.87, SD = .79; Mexp = 
4.55, SD = .55) compared to the gender conditions (Maware = 5.08, SD = .88; Mblind = 3.53, SD = 
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1.07; Mexp = 4.88, SD = .83). See Table 9 for contrasts. Notably, this finding may suggest that the 
ideological manipulation had a stronger effect in the gender, compared to the race conditions.  
System Justification. 
I find no main effects of social category (p = .29) or ideology (p = .61); however, I find 
the expected social category x ideology interaction, F(2, 351) = 4.47, p = .01, ηp2 = .025. In the 
race conditions, comparing the awareness and blindness conditions, I find directional support in 
the race condition, whereby those in the awareness condition endorsed system justification (M = 
3.61, SD = 1.33) directionally (though not significantly) less than those in the blindness 
condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.33), t(351) = -1.60, d = -.28, p = .11. The experience awareness 
condition fell between the two undirected conditions, not significantly differing from the aware 
(p = .42) or blind (p = .43) conditions. In the gender condition, I replicate previous findings, 
whereby those in the awareness condition (M = 4.03, SD = 1.50) endorsed system justification 
more than those in the blindness condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.40), t(351) = 2.47, d = .36, p = .01. 
Furthermore, in line with my hypotheses, those in the experience awareness condition endorsed 
system justification less than those in the aware condition (M = 3.52, SD = 1.29), t(351) = -2.05, 
d = -.37, p = .041. See Figure 7a. 
System-Justifying Rationales 
Denial of inequality. I find no main effects of social category (p = .61) or ideology (p = 
.88), but as expected, I find a significant social category x ideology interaction, F(2, 351) = 3.37, 
p = .035, ηp2 = .019. For race, those in the awareness condition directionally endorsed denial of 
inequality less than those in the blindness condition (Maware = 3.05, SD = 1.39; Mblind = 3.41, SD 
= 1.63), t(351) = -1.45, d = -.24, p = .15. Those in the experience awareness condition (M = 3.35, 
SD = 1.46) did not differ from either the aware (p = .22) or blind (p = .81) conditions. In contrast, 
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in the gender conditions, those in the awareness (M = 3.52, SD = 1.30) condition endorsed denial 
of inequality more than those in the blindness condition (M = 3.07, SD = 1.46), t(351) = 1.94, d = 
.42, p = .05. Further, in line with the hypotheses, those in the experience awareness condition (M 
= 3.07, SD = 1.46), endorsed denial of inequality marginally less than those in the aware, t(351) 
= -1.67, d = -.33, p = .097, but no differently from those in the blind (p = .75) condition. See 
Figure 7b. 
Essentialism. For essentialism, I find a significant main effect across social category, 
F(1, 351) = 12.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .036, whereby people endorsed gender essentialism (M = 4.11, 
SD = 1.36) significantly more than race essentialism (M = 3.63, SD = 1.15). There was also a 
main effect of social category (p = .04); however, this effect was qualified by the expected social 
category x ideology interaction, F(2, 351) = 4.23, p = .015 ηp2 = .024. Replicating past results, 
within the race condition, manipulating ideologies did not affect endorsement of race 
essentialism (Maware = 3.61, SD = 1.18; Maware = 3.66, SD = 1.11; Mexperience = 3.62, SD = 1.15; all 
p’s > .80). Within the gender conditions, those in the awareness condition (M = 4.53, SD = 1.23) 
endorsed gender essentialism significantly more than those in the blindness condition (M = 3.65, 
SD = 1.39), t(351) = 3.71, d = .67, p < .001. The experience awareness condition fell between the 
two, whereby those in the experience-aware condition (M = 4.13, SD = 1.34) endorsed gender 
essentialism marginally less, t(351) = -1.72, d = -.31, p = .086, than those in the awareness 
condition, but significantly more than those in the blindness condition, t(351) = 2.04, d = .35, p = 
.04. See Figure 7c. 
Opportunity Outcomes 
Attitudes toward affirmative action. I do not find a significant main effect of social 
category (p = .42) or ideology condition (p = .59). However, I find a marginal social category x 
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ideology interaction, F(2, 351) = 2.62, p = .074, ηp2 = .015. In the race conditions, I do not find a 
significant effect of ideology on attitudes toward affirmative action (Maware = 3.76, SD = 1.57; 
Mblind = 3.43, SD =1.50; Mexperience = 3.65, SD =1.45; all p’s > .20). In contrast, in the gender 
conditions, those in the awareness condition (M = 3.39, SD = 1.50) supported affirmative action 
marginally less than those in the blindness (M = 3.91, SD =1.35), t(351) = -1.80, d = -.34, p = 
.072, and experience awareness (M = 3.91, SD =1.53) t(351) = -1.83, d = -.36, p = .068, 
conditions. The blindness and experience awareness conditions did not differ from one another 
(p = .99). See Figure 7d. 
Stereotyping. 
 Race. I find a marginal main effect across social categories, F(2, 190) = 2.50, p = .085, 
ηp2 = .026, such that those in the awareness condition (M = 3.64, SD = .41) stereotyped more than 
those in the blindness (M = 3.46, SD = .46) condition, t(190) = 2.23, d = .43, p = .027. The 
experience awareness condition (M = 3.55, SD = .52) did not differ from either the aware or the 
blind conditions (p’s > .25). 
 Gender. I find a significant main effect across social categories, F(2, 161) = 6.08, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .07, such that those in the blindness condition (M = 3.58, SD = .60) stereotyped less 
than both the awareness (M = 3.88, SD = .56), t(161) = -2.86, d = -.52, p = .005, and experience 
awareness (M = 3.91, SD = .49), t(161) = -3.19, d = -.60, p = .002, conditions. The awareness 
and experience awareness condition did not differ from one another (p = .76), suggesting that 
compared to blindness, experience awareness is not effective at stereotype reduction. See Figure 
7e. 
Discussion 
 Study 5 extended the findings of the past four studies, whereby I attempted to redirect the 
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types of differences being focused on through awareness and blindness. For race, I did not find 
strong effects of ideological condition overall. Thus, while my prediction that race awareness 
and experience awareness would not differ from one another was technically supported, these 
effects did not differ from race blindness, and therefore were not comparatively effective in 
reducing endorsement of system justification or system-justifying rationales. However, I find 
support for Hypothesis 5b, whereby compared to gender-awareness, experience awareness leads 
to less system justification, endorsement of system-justifying rationales, and more support for 
affirmative action for gender. 
 While this study provides some preliminary support for redirecting differences, it does so 
with several limitations. For one, contrasts between conditions were often weak, and oftentimes 
not significant. The large standard deviations muting effect sizes may suggest an important 
moderator within this study. Further, a larger number of individuals were excluded due to 
disagreement and disbelief of these messages. Past research has suggested that many race and 
gender beliefs and biases are malleable and can be shaped by news and media stories within a 
given day and time (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof & Vermeulen, 2009; Ramasubramanian, 
2007). It is unclear whether an external event made race/gender beliefs more/less salient; 
however, this may be the case, given the robustness of these effects across studies (see meta-
analysis) and past research which has found similar effects for race on system justification, 
denial of inequality, and affirmative action (see Mazzocco et al., 2011; Knowles et al., 2009; 
Wolsko et al., 2006). Further, it is notable that the extent to which individuals endorsed the 
awareness measure (the manipulation check) differed significantly across conditions (see Table 
9); thus, the extent to which the manipulation affected awareness endorsement may have had an 
effect on outcomes of interest.  
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Additionally, while my prediction that experience awareness would affect external 
outcomes (denial of inequality and affirmative action) was supported, it did not diminish 
stereotyping. This is problematic, as stereotyping is a large factor preventing many groups, but 
especially women, from reaching positions of power (Heilman, 2001). Thus, though redirecting 
differences toward external sources may aid in developing policies that increase representation of 
women (such as affirmative action) it may not reduce stereotyping of women and thus, the 
efficacy of this intervention is unclear.  
Finally, while I found that directing attributions toward external sources was an effective 
intervention on a number of outcomes, gender blindness remained an equally, if not more, 
effective intervention on all outcomes (including stereotyping). Thus, while directing awareness 
toward external sources may provide an effective intervention for both race and gender 
inequality, it seems muting internal differences remains a more effective intervention for gender 
inequality. Future research should examine the combination of minimizing internal differences, 
while emphasizing external differences, to leverage the power of these ideologies.  
Study 7: Experience Awareness on Gender Outcomes 
 Study 7 sought to replicate the effects of Study 6, specifically focusing on gender. In the 
last study, I found some support for my hypotheses that experience awareness may have the 
potential to aid in mitigating system justification and related outcomes for gender (though not 
necessarily race). Given the focus on providing an intervention that mitigates the negative effects 
of gender awareness in the last study, I focus on the potential of experience awareness for gender 
to examine its potential for leveraging the benefits for gender inequality.  
In this study, I use the same paradigm as Study 6, whereby 282 male participants from 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (non-overlapping with previous studies) were invited to take part in 
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a study on “Reading and Comprehension” and “Attitudes and Perceptions.” Six participants were 
removed for failing a manipulation check, and 69 (24%) for disagreeing with the premise of the 
ideology. The final sample consisted of 207 men (78% White, 8% Asian, 5% Black, 6% 
Hispanic, 3% Other), with an average age of 37.69 (SD = 12.33). Fifty-seven percent of the 
sample had a bachelor’s degree or more education, with on average 15.56 years of work 
experience (SD = 8.12).   
Again, participants were recruited for what was ostensibly a two-part study on 1) 
“Evaluating Press Releases” and 2) “Attitudes and “Evaluations.” In the first part of the study, 
participants were given a list of eight possible press releases that they could receive and then 
asked to evaluate an article espousing the merits of an awareness versus blindness versus 
experience awareness approach. They then moved on to the second part of the study, where they 
were asked to answer questions about their attitudes and opinions, filling out scales related to 
system justification, system-justifying rationales (denial of inequality and biological 
essentialism), and opportunity outcomes (attitudes toward affirmative action and stereotypes). 
After answering these questions, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.  
Dependent Variables 
Manipulation check. Participants filled out the awareness measure, rating their 
endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .87). 
 System justification. Participants completed the system justification measure (Kay & 
Jost, 2003) on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .91). 
 System-justifying rationales. 
 Denial of inequality. Participants filled out the denial of discrimination/privilege measure 
rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .91) 
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Biological essentialism. Participants completed the biological essentialism measure, 
rating their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree (a = .87). 
 Opportunity outcomes. 
Attitudes toward affirmative action. I use the same items as in Study 4, where participants 
rated their endorsement on a scale from 1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly disagree (a = .90).  
 Stereotypes. I use the same stereotypes as in all studies thus far for gender (agency [a = 
.78], communality [a = .81], and overall [a = .85]). 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 There was a significant effect of the manipulation on awareness endorsement, F(2, 204) = 
26.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, such that those in the blindness condition endorsed an awareness 
ideology less (M = 3.79, SD = 1.03) than both those in the awareness condition (M = 4.85, SD = 
.90), t(204) = -6.26, d = -1.11, p < .001, and those in the experience awareness condition (M = 
4.88, SD = 1.03), t(204) = -6.51, d = -1.17, p < .001. There were no differences between the 
awareness and the experience awareness conditions (p = .88), suggesting that the experience 
awareness manipulation had its intended effect and led participants to endorse an “awareness” 
ideology. Correlations between variables can be found in Table 10. 
System Justification 
 Counter to hypotheses, I find no effect of condition on system justification, F(2, 204) = 
.04, p = .96, ηp2 < .001, such that there were no significant differences between conditions (Maware 
= 3.89, SD = 1.46; Mblind = 3.89, SD = 1.40; Mexp = 3.83, SD = 1.31), with no significant contrasts 
between conditions (p’s > .80). 
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System-Justifying Rationales 
Denial of inequality. I find a significant effect on denial of inequality, F(2, 204) = 3.68, 
p = .027, ηp2 = .035. Consistent with past studies, I find those in the awareness condition (M = 
3.66, SD = 1.24) endorsed denial of inequality more than those in the blindness condition (M = 
3.11, SD = 1.33), t(204) = 2.05, d = .43, p = .01. In line with hypotheses, those in the experience 
awareness condition (M = 3.20, SD = 1.25) endorsed denial of inequality less than those in the 
awareness condition, t(204) = -2.16, d = -.37, p = .03, but not differently from those in the 
blindness condition (p = .69). 
Biological essentialism. I find a significant effect on biological essentialism, F(2, 204) = 
5.71, p = .004, ηp2 = .053. Consistent with past studies, I find those in the awareness condition (M 
= 4.55, SD = 1.01) endorsed biological essentialism more than those in the blindness condition 
(M = 3.84, SD = 1.33), t(204) = 3.36, d = .43, p < .001. In line with hypotheses, those in the 
experience awareness condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.27) endorsed denial of inequality less than 
those in the awareness condition, t(204) = -1.97, d = -.36, p = .05, but not differently from those 
in the blindness condition (p = .18). 
Opportunity Outcomes 
Attitudes toward affirmative action. I find a significant effect on attitudes toward 
affirmative action, F(2, 204) = 3.74, p = .025, ηp2 = .035. Consistent with past studies, I find 
those in the awareness condition (M = 3.36, SD = 1.41) were less supportive of affirmative action 
policies, compared to those in the blindness condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.55), t(204) = -2.45, d = 
.-42, p = .015. In line with hypotheses, those in the experience awareness condition (M = 3.92, 
SD = 1.44) endorsed denial of inequality less than those in the awareness condition, t(204) = -
2.29, d = -.39, p = .023, but not differently from those in the blindness condition (p = .83). 
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Stereotypes. I find a significant effect on stereotyping, F(2, 204) = 3.27, p = .040, ηp2 = 
.031. Consistent with past studies, I find those in the awareness condition (M = 3.71, SD = .49) 
were more likely to endorse gender stereotypes, compared to those in the blindness condition (M 
= 3.50, SD = .49), t(204) = 2.48, d = .43, p = .01. In line with results found in Study 6, those in 
the experience awareness condition (M = 3.65, SD = .51) were marginally more likely to 
stereotype than those in the blindness condition, t(204) = 1.80, d = .30, p = .07, and endorsed 
stereotypes similarly to those in the awareness condition (p = .47). 
Mediations 
 Though there was no direct effect of the ideological conditions on system justification, 
recall that my argument predicts the effects of system justification to operate through system-
justifying rationales; and thus, non-significant paths do not preclude testing for an indirect effect 
(Hayes, 2009; Rucker, Preacher, Tormala & Petty, 2011). To examine the effects of mediation 
with a three-level categorical variable, I computed two dummy variables that when both entered 
represent all three levels. Specifically, using PROCESS Model 4 (with 5,000 bootstraps) I 
entered the two critical dummy variables (1 = experience-aware, 0 = aware, 0 = blind), with a 
control dummy (1 = blind, 0 = experience-aware, 0 = aware), which tested for the presence of the 
indirect effect between the experience aware and aware conditions through denial of inequality. 
Indeed, relative to gender awareness, both experience awareness (indirect effect = -.27, SE = .13, 
CI95 = -.53, -.02) and gender blindness (indirect effect = -.32, SE = .13, CI95 = -.59, -.06) lessened 
denial of inequality, which decreased support for the status quo. The same pattern occurred 
through essentialism, whereby, relative to gender awareness, both experience awareness (indirect 
effect = -.18, SE = .10, CI95 = -.39, -.01) and gender blindness (indirect effect = -.32, SE = .11, 
CI95 = -.56, -.12) decreased system justification through essentialism.  
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After testing indirect effects on system justification, I also examined whether experience 
awareness would affect opportunity outcomes through system-justifying rationales. As with 
Study 4, I examined whether ideology condition effects on attitudes toward affirmative action 
could be explained by denial of inequality, as a system-justifying rationale. Indeed, I find that the 
effects of experience awareness (indirect effect = .34, SE = .16, CI95 = .04, .67) and gender 
blindness (indirect effect = .42, SE = .17, CI95 = .09, .76) on support for affirmative action 
operate through denial of inequality.  
I also examined whether gender essentialism would provide an indirect pathway between 
ideological conditions and gender stereotyping. As with Study 4, I find that the reduced 
stereotyping that follows gender blindness can be explained by gender essentialism (indirect 
effect = .42, SE = .17, CI95 = .09, .76). Further while I do not find that experience awareness 
directly reduces stereotyping (compared to gender awareness), the mediated path through 
essentialism provides an indirect effect (indirect effect = -.04, SE = .02, CI95 = -.08, -.002). In 
other words, experience awareness reduces essentialist beliefs, which in turn reduced gender 
stereotyping.  
Discussion 
 Study 7 showed that, for women, experience awareness provides the potential to leverage 
an awareness ideology to achieve similar benefits to gender blindness, lessening system-
justifying rationales, and increasing support for affirmative action. While this study provides 
some support for redirecting differences, I find that there was no main effect on system 
justification between conditions. My argument is premised on the assumption that it is through 
system-justifying rationales that diversity ideologies differentially affect the status quo; thus, by 
finding system justification affected through these mechanisms I support my hypothesis, and as I 
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demonstrate next through a meta-analysis, despite this null result, the effect of gender ideologies 
on system justification appears to be robust (see meta-analysis below). However, it remains 
unclear why system justification was unaffected by the experimental manipulations. Further, for 
stereotyping, I again find that experience awareness was more similar to gender awareness, 
suggesting the potential for experience awareness to exacerbate stereotyping. Nonetheless, in this 
study I find an indirect effect, such that experience awareness reduced gender essentialism, 
which in turn reduced gender stereotyping. Thus, it is clear more research is needed to 
understand the implications of experience awareness on outcomes that affect women.  
Meta-Analysis 
 Given the apparent heterogeneity in the effect size across awareness and system 
justification (and accompanying rationales), I conducted an internal meta-analysis of studies that 
directly compared and contrasted race and gender awareness (versus blindness) on system 
justification, denial of inequality, and essentialism, following the procedures outlined in 
Rosenthal (1991), for combining and comparing effect sizes. See Figure 8 for plots. 
Awareness Ideologies on System Justification 
Race. For race awareness, I find a robust negative relationship between race awareness 
and system justification, such that those who endorse or are primed with awareness (compared to 
blindness) are less likely to justify the status quo (r = -.25, p < .001). Further, comparing both 
awareness and blindness to control conditions, I find the baseline level of system justification 
does not differ from race blindness (r = .07, p = .25), but is significantly reduced through race 
awareness (r = -.15, p = .02).  
Gender. Similarly, I find a robust positive relationship between gender awareness and 
system justification (r = .19, p < .001), such that those who endorse or are primed with gender 
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awareness are more likely to support system justification. Further, I find the control conditions 
are more in line with gender awareness, where system justification endorsement does not differ 
from gender-aware conditions (r = .10, p = .13), but is significantly less endorsed in the gender-
blind conditions (r = -.15, p = .03). This result seems to suggest that race blindness and gender 
awareness represent the status quo, as they are system-justifying rationales.  
Awareness Ideologies on Rationales for Inequality  
 Race. I find consistent support that race awareness relates to less denial of inequality (r = 
-.25, p < .001). Consistent with arguments for race blindness as the baseline I find no differences 
in denial of inequality between blind and control (r = -.01, p = .99), but significantly less 
endorsement in the aware conditions (r = -.25, p < .001). Further, I find no effect of race 
awareness on essentialism (r = -.02, p = .60). 
Gender. I find a robust positive effect of gender awareness on denial of inequality (r = 
.26, p < .001), such that compared to blindness, gender awareness related to more denial of 
inequality; however, neither gender awareness (r = .14, p = .06) nor blindness (r = .08, p = .32) 
significantly deviated from the control. Further, I find a significant positive effect of gender 
awareness on essentialism (r = .40, p < .001), where the gender awareness condition led to 
greater essentialist beliefs (r = .15, p = .03) while gender blindness led to lesser essentialist 
beliefs (r = -.19, p < .008). Thus, while gender awareness may represent the status quo (as noted 
above), it seems that awareness increases essentialism, while blindness decreases it from the 
baseline. Further, though gender awareness related to both denial of inequality and essentialism 
rationales, consistent with my argument, the effect of essentialism was much more pronounced, 
corroborating my argument that essentialism represents a stronger system-justifying rationale.  
Discussion 
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 This meta-analysis offered support that across studies, race and gender awareness had 
divergent effects on system justification and affected unique system-justifying rationales. For 
race, awareness negatively related to system justification and denial of inequality (but not 
essentialism), supporting the notion that race awareness exposes inequality and lessens 
justification for the status quo. In contrast, for gender, awareness positively related to system 
justification as well as denial of inequality and essentialism. Supporting my hypotheses, 
awareness represents a system-justifying rationale that increases biological notions of gender 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 The present research proposed, tested, and demonstrated that the same approaches to 
diversity—either being aware of or blind to differences—had divergent effects on certain forms 
of race and gender inequality. I argued the types of differences being embraced versus 
suppressed through race and gender awareness differentially supported the status quo, creating 
different baselines upon which ideologies intervene. That is, both being blind to racial 
(opportunity) and aware of gender (role) differences serve to legitimize inequality, maintain 
power for the dominant group, and justify the current status quo. For race, awareness promotes 
equality by exposing the opportunity-limiting differences facing Blacks, lessening denial of 
inequality, decreasing support for the status quo, and increasing support for affirmative action 
policies. In contrast, for gender, awareness hinders equality by embracing biological, social-role 
differences, which legitimizes the gender-hierarchy by seeing men as more capable of leadership 
and success.  
In Chapter 1, I provided an initial test of this hypothesis, both validating and measuring 
(Study 1 – 2), as well as manipulating (Study 3) race and gender diversity ideologies, and 
examining their divergent relationship to system justification. In line with hypotheses, I find that 
race awareness is negatively related to system justification, suggesting it is a system-disrupting 
ideology; whereas gender awareness is positively related to system justification, suggesting it is a 
system-justifying ideology. Further, I give insight into why race and gender awareness ideologies 
have divergent effects on system justification, demonstrating their relationships to distinct 
system-justifying rationales. I show that race blindness serves as a system-justifying ideology, as 
it allows Whites to deny inequality between racial groups; thus, race awareness exposes racial 
inequality, thereby lessening support for the status quo. In contrast, gender awareness acts on a 
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unique system-justifying rationale—gender essentialism—thereby allowing individuals to 
embrace the status quo by seeing men and women’s differences as biological, natural, and 
unchangeable, thus legitimizing the status quo.  
In Chapter 2, I showed the downstream consequences of these awareness ideologies for 
outcomes that affect racial minorities’ and women’s opportunities (opportunity outcomes). In 
Study 4, I experimentally manipulate awareness and blindness and show the consequences of 
diversity ideologies for outcomes that affect racial minority and female representation in 
positions of power: attitudes toward affirmative action and stereotyping, respectively. I show that 
race awareness increases Whites’ support for policies that disrupt the status quo and provide 
solutions to inequality (i.e., affirmative action). In contrast, awareness ideologies heighted 
traditional gender stereotyping. Further, I show that these effects are distinctly driven by the 
system-justifying rationales race and gender awareness ideologies act upon. For race, awareness 
decreases denial of inequality, thereby increasing support for affirmative action: a policy that 
address inequity between Blacks and Whites. For gender, awareness increases biological 
essentialism, which heightens gender stereotyping and associates men with leadership.  
In Chapter 3, I provide an intervention that directs differences toward experience, to 
provide a holistic intervention for race and gender as well as support my theory that race and 
gender awareness act upon unique types of differences (external versus internal), which 
differentially support the status quo and cause their divergent effects. First, I examine this in an 
institutional setting, showing that when awareness is directed toward experiences (opportunity, 
experience, issues, treatment), endorsement of both race and gender awareness relates to less 
system justification (Study 5). Next, I examine the consequences of experience awareness, 
examining the effects of this approach for system justification, system-justifying rationales, and 
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opportunity outcomes for women and minorities. While I do not find strong support for 
experience awareness for race (which I expected to differ from blind but have similar effect to 
the aware condition) in Study 6, for gender, I find that compared to awareness, experience 
awareness lessened endorsement of system-justifying rationales (denial of inequality, 
essentialism), which had implications for system justification and opportunity outcomes (Study 
6—7). Thus, by directing which types of differences awareness acts upon, I provide an 
intervention that renders awareness similarly effective for both race and gender (see Study 5). 
By meta-analyzing these results, I show the consistent, robust, and divergent effects of 
race and gender awareness on system justification and system-justifying rationales. I demonstrate 
that race awareness solely acts upon a denial of inequality system-justifying rationale, leading 
Whites to be more cognizant of inequality, and does not act upon essentialist beliefs. 
Additionally, I show that while gender awareness also acts upon a denial of inequality rationale, 
gender essentialism shows a stronger relationship, offering a more effective rationalization. 
Finally, I show for race, blindness represents the status quo, showing no differences compared to 
the baseline (control), whereas awareness decreases system justification and denial of inequality, 
corroborating my argument that race awareness is a system-disrupting ideology. In contrast, I 
show that for gender, awareness represents the status quo, showing no differences compared to 
the baseline (control), whereas blindness decreases system justification and gender essentialism.   
Theoretical and Practical Contributions 
 By showing the divergent effects of awareness ideologies for race and gender relations, I 
contribute to multiple theories, showing how and why the same diversity approach that works for 
one group can backfire when applied to another, and caution against holistic approaches to 
diversity.  
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Diversity ideologies. I add to the literature on diversity in several ways, offering a 
unified theory of why and how diversity ideologies help or hinder intergroup relations, 
questioning their holistic applicability to race and gender relations, and providing a unified 
solution toward bettering both race and gender relations.  
First, although research has shown that ideologies can have benefits for interracial 
relations, here I present a unified demonstration of why race awareness seems to improve 
intergroup dynamics. By showing the theoretical foundations (testing system justification and 
system-justifying rationales) and moving toward opportunity outcomes (affirmative action and 
stereotyping), I demonstrate the processes through which these effects can take place and the 
unique implications they have for Blacks and women.  
I further add to this literature by directly comparing how these ideologies act upon race 
and gender inequality, measuring the same outcomes, but showing the unique effects for both 
groups. Importantly, I distinguish between the types of differences affected by ideologies for 
race and gender. I show that for Blacks (and not women), the types of differences being exposed 
through awareness are opportunity-limiting stereotypes. For women (and not Blacks), the 
differences being suppressed through blindness are stereotypical gender-roles. As such, 
awareness exposes the opportunity-limiting nature of racial differences, but reifies the biological 
functionality of gender differences. By demonstrating that diversity ideologies act upon unique 
types of differences for race and gender, I provide insight into how to design diversity 
approaches that are effective for multiple groups. This work suggests that directing which 
differences to highlight or suppress through awareness and blindness may lead to more effective 
interventions for addressing inequality.  
Adding to the burgeoning intersectionality literature, I show that holistic approaches to 
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diversity have the potential to backfire. In the past, much research has examined effects of 
diversity, bias, and evaluation using a broad array of social identities and group affiliations to 
triangulate support for an argument (i.e., political affiliation, gender, perceptual style, race, shirt 
color). Although in-group and out-group biases can often transfer across social categories (any 
in- versus out-group will produce similar effects), here I argue that there are times and contexts 
in which it is necessary to examine social categories independently. In this case, endorsement of 
awareness versus blindness can have profoundly different effects for race and gender, and 
applying research from one social category (race) to another (gender) seems to have harmful 
consequences. This is especially important, as many assume that awareness is adaptive for 
multiple social groups; though well-intentioned, it seems as though for gender, awareness 
heightens stereotypes about men being better suited for occupational success, rendering 
blindness (or externally directed awareness) a better strategy.  
Finally, I suggest that though much work on diversity ideologies has focused on the 
antecedents and consequences of awareness and blindness ideologies, this emphasis is 
misguided. Rather than placing an overreliance on diversity ideologies as solutions, I suggest 
that it is necessary to understand the types of differences they emphasize versus suppress and the 
purpose for doing so. Both awareness and blindness have the potential—and have been shown—
to backfire for intergroup relations (see Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013 and Rattan & Ambady, 2013 for 
review). Many scholars have shown great interest in this disconnect and hypothesized a number 
of moderators (Apfelbaum et al., 2016; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004; Sasaki & Vorauer, 2013). I 
argue that this disconnect is driven by the types of differences highlighted or downplayed 
through awareness and blindness, respectively, and their role in system justification. That is, 
awareness carries both the potential to highlight inequality and increase support for systemic 
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solutions to inequality, but also the potential to highlight social roles (and therefore the “natural 
order”), exacerbating stereotypes and legitimizing inequality. Similarly, blindness carries both 
the potential to minimize and ignore inequality, decreasing support for systemic solutions, but 
also the potential to be adaptive and suppress social-role stereotypes, creating more egalitarian 
views of groups. By focusing on the types of differences we need to highlight and downplay, I 
argue there is potential to leverage both awareness and blindness to increase intergroup equality.  
Bias disruption. This research adds to the work on bias disruption for racial minorities 
and women, and offers multiple strategies to combat bias against both groups. For race, many 
individuals deny inequality and oppose affirmative action. Here, I demonstrate that race 
awareness carries the potential to increase cognizance around racial inequality and increase 
support for system-disrupting policies, with the potential to increase racial equality. Further, for 
gender, stereotypes are powerful, pervasive, and oftentimes pernicious, affecting a host of 
outcomes for women at work. Here I demonstrate that gender blindness carries the potential to 
decrease essentialist attributions for gender, and role-based stereotyping, with the potential to 
increase gender equality. Thus, the current work offers a simple debiasing strategy: simply 
encouraging individuals to be aware of racial differences and deemphasizing the salience of 
gender. These strategies are simple yet effective, and move beyond traditional, heavy-handed 
interventions that focus on bettering intergroup relations through contact (Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2000), training (Devine, Forscher, Austin & Cox 2012), and repeated reinforcement (Page-
Gould, Mendoza-Denton & Tropp, 2008). It seems that adopting a race-aware and gender-blind 
approach to differences may be an effective way to increase policy support, decrease biases, and 
ameliorate inequality.  
 Further, methodologically, I add to the measurement and intervention of diversity 
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ideologies. First, I created a validated scale that can be used to measure support of diversity 
ideologies for both race and gender, contributing to the measurement of these ideologies. 
Second, I created article manipulations, which can be used to manipulate individuals’ support for 
diversity ideologies. As Sasaki and Vorauer (2013) note, most interventions rely on the Wolsko 
et al. (2000) primes, and suggest less heavy-handed interventions would be useful. Here, I heed 
this call, adding manipulations to our social psychological tools to manipulate ideologies. 
Finally, I add to the work on holistic diversity interventions by showing that by shifting the 
content of differences being focused on for race and gender ideologies, awareness can have the 
same beneficial effects for both race and gender relations. That is, by increasing individuals’ 
focus on the opportunity, experiential, and treatment differences between Blacks and Whites and 
men and women, in both cases, awareness has the potential to reduce system justification and 
denial of inequality and increase support for affirmative action. Thus, I add a novel, yet simple 
intervention to our arsenal of strategies: experience awareness, which may provide an effective 
strategy that can be used across organizations to address both race and gender inequality (see 
Study 5). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While this research found support for both the potential and perils of awareness (and 
blindness) ideologies, it did so with several limitations.  
First, many studies examined individuals’ cognition, examining their endorsement of 
system justification, system-justifying rationales, and biases. However, more research is needed 
to understand whether these diversity ideologies have effects on actual behavior, as individuals’ 
engagement in such behavior is necessary for them to have any implications. However, much 
research has shown the behavioral correlates of system justification (see Jost et al., 2009b), 
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offering hope that these interventions can and will help.  
Second, these studies specifically focused on out-group members (Whites and men), and 
thus future research is necessary to understand how racial minorities and women react to 
ideological interventions. Indeed, past work has shown that racial minorities differ in their 
endorsement of, and reaction to, diversity ideologies (Ryan et al., 2007; Verkuyten, 2005), and 
thus it is important to examine outcomes for both groups, such as their self-perceptions and 
behavior. Further, I solely examined dominant groups’ reactions to subordinate groups. Future 
research is needed to examine how these ideologies affect Whites’ and men’s self-perception and 
behavior toward other members of their respective in-groups. Finally, in examining racial 
ideologies, I focus on Black-White relations, as these remain contentious, complex, and anxiety-
laden (Markus et al., 2000; Ryan et al., 2007), and also to speak to past research on diversity 
ideologies, which predominantly examine these relations. However, it is important to understand 
the effects of race ideologies for all racial groups in the United States and beyond. In some 
contexts, where stereotypes are positive and readily embraced, awareness can exacerbate 
stereotypes (Gutiérrez & Unzueta, 2010) and increase representational concerns (Apfelbaum et 
al., 2016). Thus, examining the effects of diversity ideologies for other groups remains a fruitful 
area for future research.  
Third, neither gender nor race are monolithic categories. I examined overall attitudes 
toward Blacks and women; however, much past research has shown that the most salient 
categories of those social groups are Black men and White women (see Purdie-Vaughns & 
Eibach, 2008). However, there is both confusion and contradiction of simultaneously being 
aware of and blind to difference for an individual who holds multiple subordinate categories 
(i.e., Black women). Thus, it is important—if not imperative— to understand the implications of 
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ideologies for all individuals whom they might affect. Specifically, the implications of these 
ideologies for Black women is unclear, and future research is needed to examine how these 
approaches to difference affect intersectional categories, who are just as (and sometimes more) 
affected by the discrimination these approaches seek to overcome.  
With regards to the utility of my experience awareness intervention, I did not find that 
this strategy worked above and beyond gender blindness; indeed, stereotyping (a primary 
opportunity outcome of interest) remained unaffected by this intervention. Further, awareness 
interventions—both undirected and externally directed—at times heightened participants’ 
endorsement of positive, cultural, racial stereotypes. Though acknowledging positive stereotypes 
can sometimes be adaptive in recognizing the unique cultures and identities different groups may 
experience (Devine & Elliot, 1995), they can also insidiously create a “minority spotlight” or 
“positive stereotype threat” effect (Zou & Cheryan, 2015), leading to negative consequences. 
Though experience awareness may highlight the different experiences, obstacles, and 
opportunities of women, increasing support for policy changes, it may not be effective in 
reducing the stereotypes that can hinder both women’s and racial minorities’ opportunities; thus, 
more work on interventions that both increase awareness of external (opportunity, experiential) 
differences, but blind individuals to internal (biological, stereotypical) differences is needed.  
CONCLUSION 
 Given that many groups, organizations, and nations endorse holistic approaches to 
diversity, advocating for the recognition and acceptance of differences, it is important to 
understand the unintended consequences of this approach. It seems as though this approach is not 
equally effective for all groups, and that, especially for women, it may unintentionally exacerbate 
prejudice. Not only is it important to understand the effectiveness of diversity ideologies, but it is 
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equally—if not more—important to understand the types of differences being discussed and the 
purpose for doing so. By recognizing differences in experience, and blinding differences in 
social roles, diversity science can leverage both awareness and blindness ideologies as a solution 
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N = 91; † < .10 * p < .05 ** p <.01 *** p < .001.  
Race 
    M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Awareness 4.31 0.94           
2 System Justification 3.92 1.39 -.45***          
3 Opportunity Attributions 4.60 1.90 .24* -.38***         
4 Modern Prejudice 3.52 1.65 -.44*** .63*** -.71***        
5 Symbolic Racism 2.66 0.76 -.35** .53*** -.67*** .88***       
6 Protestant Work Ethic 4.42 1.13 -.22* .48*** -.26* .54*** .53***      
7 Biological Attributions 2.86 1.89 .15 .13 -.12 .25* .35** .29*     
8 Essentialism 3.83 1.12 .07 .10 -.27* .34** .41*** .17 .53***    
9 Stereotyping (All) 3.41 0.42 .11 .24* -.18 .33*** .39*** .26* .17 .23*   
10 Positive Stereotyping 3.38 0.51 .25* -.06 .06 -.11 -.13 -.001 -.07 -0.13 .67***  
11 Negative Stereotyping 3.44 0.63 -.06 .37** -.29** .54*** .64*** .35** .28* .41*** .79*** .08 
Gender 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Awareness 4.36 0.90            
2 System Justification 4.07 1.17 .31**           
3 Biological Attribution 4.58 1.92 .52*** .38***          
4 Essentialism 4.34 1.13 .65*** .39*** .49***         
5 Stereotyping (All) 3.72 0.55 .38*** .09 .36** .30**        
6 Agency Stereotyping 3.63 0.59 .37*** .03 .34** .35** .89***       
7 Communal Stereotyping 3.81 0.63 .30** .14 .31** .20† .91*** .62***      
8 Benevolent Sexism 3.23 1.23 .39*** 29** .31** .17 .24* .10 .32**     
9 Opportunity Attribution 4.49 1.80 -.19† -.20† -.13 -.32** .08 .09 .06 .03   
10 Modern Prejudice 3.84 1.55 .49*** .42*** .49*** .65*** .17 .24* .08 .01 -.44***   
11 Protestant Work Ethic 4.39 0.86 .43*** .37*** .29** .43*** .25* .22* .23* .41*** -.16 .36** 
12 Hostile Sexism 3.01 1.36 .41*** .12 .56*** .48*** .29** .32** .20† .18† -.23* .64*** .34** 
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Table 3: Correlations Between Variables in Study 3 
Note: Correlations for race and gender conditions below and above diagonal, respectively. #7 represents symbolic prejudice in the race conditions 
and hostile prejudice in the gender conditions † < .10 * p < .05 ** p <.01 *** p < .001. 
 
 
 Table 4: Contrasts Between Social Category and Ideology Conditions in Study 3 
Subscripts that differ represent significant differences below p < .055. 





    Race Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
    M SD M SD                 
1. Condition (Blind vs. Aware) 1.45 0.50 1.44 0.50 - -.44*** -.31** -.27* -.32*** -.18 -.16 -.08 
2. Awareness 4.40 0.96 4.41 1.10 -.37*** - .21* .38*** .58*** .11 .23* .14 
3. System Justification 3.68 1.31 3.80 1.44 .24* -.40*** - .41*** .27** .35*** .15 .19* 
4. Denial of Inequality (z-score) 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 .27* -59*** .60*** - .58*** .48*** 60*** .16† 
5. Biological Essentialism 3.19 1.23 4.29 1.08 .21* -.28** .37*** .53*** - .33*** .47*** .39*** 
6. Social Dominance 2.04 1.13 2.61 1.26 .07 -.36*** .40*** .55*** .36*** - .54*** .15 
7.  [Symbolic] [Hostile] Prejudice 2.05 0.68 2.57 1.06 .32** -.53*** -.54*** .86*** .61*** .49*** - .35*** 












M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Race Aware 4.73a,d 0.89 3.41a 1.39 2.96a 1.27 -.28a 0.84 1.87a .97     
 Blind 4.02b 0.97 4.10b 1.22 3.46b 1.33 .28b 1.17 2.03a 1.17     
 Control 4.36c 0.93 3.62a,c 1.24 3.21a,b 1.11 .05a,b 0.95 2.20a 1.24     
                
Gender Aware 4.85a 1.08 4.20b 1.39 4.58d 1.10 .20c 1.02 2.78b 1.20 2.64a .98 2.99a 1.11 
 Blind 3.78b 1.12 3.28a 1.47 3.86b,e 1.02 -.27d 1.02 2.32a,b 1.33 2.33a 1.01 2.83a 1.00 
 Control 4.46c,d 0.88 3.82a,b,c 1.36 4.34d,e 1.01 -.04c,d 0.92 2.67b 1.27 2.70a 1.16 2.72a 1.09 
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Table 5: Correlation Table in Study 4 
 
	   Race Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
    M SD M SD                   
1. Condition (Blind v. Aware) 1.51 0.50 1.50 0.50 - -.51*** -.20* -.13 -.33*** .08 -.21* -.24** -.15 
2. Awareness 4.15 0.94 4.41 1.00 -.53*** - .25** .29*** .52*** -.34*** .27*** .20** .27*** 
3. System Justification 3.94 1.37 3.85 1.30 .19* -.03 - .38*** .22** -.19* .09 .14† .01 
4. Denial of Inequality 3.52 1.44 3.60 1.24 .22* -.03 .44*** - .56*** -.66*** .10 .18* .01 
5. Biological Essentialism 3.64 1.14 4.33 1.15 -.07 .18** .19** .39*** - -.63*** .32*** .32*** .25** 
6. Attitudes toward AA 3.40 1.44 3.58 1.27 -.21* .07 -.28*** -.69*** -.32*** - -.19* -.20** -.14† 
7.  Stereotyping 3.51 0.53 3.54 0.46 -.06 .02 .08 .21** .15* -.25** - .88*** .89*** 
8.  Pos. [Agency] Stereotyping 3.49 0.65 3.44 0.43 -.07 -.01 .05 .10 -.02 -.16* .85*** - .58*** 
9. Neg. [Comm.] Stereotyping 3.52 0.62 3.68 0.67 -.04 .04 .09 .25*** .23** -.27** .82*** .40*** - 
Note: Correlations for race and gender conditions below and above diagonal, respectively. † p < .10 * p < .05 ** p <.01 *** p < .001.  
 
 







Columns that share different subscripts are significant at p < .055. 











M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Race Aware 4.70a 0.82 3.56a 1.33 3.64a 1.23 3.00a 1.32 3.49a 0.49 3.89a 1.37 
 Blind 3.63b 0.88 4.07b 1.37 3.48a 1.01 3.62b 1.44 3.42a 0.58 3.30b,c 1.46 
 Control 4.14c 0.81 4.14b 1.36 3.77a 1.16 3.87b 1.44 3.59a 0.51 3.07c 1.39 
              
 Aware 4.98a 0.92 4.10b 1.34 4.70b 0.96 3.79b 1.30 3.61b 0.44 3.50a,b,c 1.32 
Gender Blind 3.87b 0.98 3.57a 1.26 3.96c 1.18 3.47b 1.12 3.41c 0.45 3.69a,b 1.18 




Table 7: Awareness Endorsement on System Justification in Study 5 
Gender  Race 
  Model 1 Model 2    
Model 
1 Model 2 
Gender Awareness -0.18 -0.14  Race Awareness -0.14 -.10 
 (.05)*** (0.51)**   (.05)** (.04)* 
White  0.28  Male  .41 
  (0.19)    (.15)** 
Age  -0.04  Age  -.03 
  (0.04)    (.03) 
Sexuality  0.37  Sexuality  .52 
  (0.33)    (.31)† 
Relationship Status  0.31  Relationship Status  -.19 
  (0.17)†    (.15) 
Political Ideology  0.20  Political Ideology  -.24 
  (0.07)**    (.05)*** 
Tenure at School  -0.33  Tenure at School  -.29 
  (0.17)†    (.15)* 
_cons  6.55  _cons  7.26 
  (1.16)***    (1.05)*** 
R2  0.15  R2  0.24 
N   202  N   226 
 
† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 
White coded such that 1 = White; 0 = Non-White 
Male coded such that 1 = Male; 0 = Female 
Sexuality coded such that 1 = Straight; 0 = Other 
Relationship status coded such that 1 = In Relationship; 0 = Single 
Political Ideology coded such that 1 = very liberal - 7 = very conservative 
Tenure at School coded such that 0 = less than 1 year; 1 = 1 year or more
  
Table 8: Correlation Table for Study 6 
 
Table 9: Contrasts between Social Category and Ideology Conditions in Study 6 
Ideology 





M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
             
Race             
Aware 4.58a 0.79 3.61a,c 1.33 3.05a 1.39 3.61a 1.18 3.76a,b,c 1.57 3.65a 0.42 
Blind 3.87b 0.79 3.98a,b 1.33 3.41a,b 1.62 3.66a,c 1.11 3.42a 1.50 3.46b 0.46 
Experience 4.55a 0.55 3.80a,b,c 1.03 3.35a,b 1.46 3.62a,c 1.15 3.65a,b,c 1.45 3.56a,b 0.52 
             
Gender             
Aware 5.08c 0.88 4.03b 1.50 3.52b 1.30 4.53b 1.23 3.39a,b 1.50 3.88a 0.56 
Blind 3.53d 1.07 3.40c 1.4 2.98a 1.29 3.65c 1.39 3.91c 1.35 3.58b 0.60 
Expereince 4.88c 0.83 3.20c 1.29 3.07a 1.46 4.13d 1.34 3.91c 1.53 3.91a 0.49 
Columns that share different subscripts are significant at p < .10 
*Stereotypes represent cultural stereotypes within race, and gender stereotypes within gender, and not compared across social categories. 
  Race Gender 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  M SD M SD          
1. Condition (Blind v. Aware) 1.50 0.50 1.51 0.50 - - - .63*** .21* .21* .32*** -.18† .26** 
2. Condition (Aware v. E-Aware) 1.50 0.50 1.51 0.50 - - - -.12 -.18† -.16† -.16 .17† .03 
3. Condition (Blind v. E-Aware) 1.50 0.50 1.52 0.50 - - - .58*** .04 .03 .18† -.001 .30** 
4. Awareness 4.34 0.79 4.52 1.15 .41*** -.02 .45*** - .26*** .25** .58*** -.24** .36*** 
5. System Justification 3.80 1.24 3.65 1.42 -.14 .08 -.08 -.22** - .37*** .32*** -.18* -.001 
6. Denial of Inequality 3.27 1.50 3.19 1.37 -.12 .11 -.02 -.22** .59*** - .47*** -.69*** -.20** 
7. Biological Essentialism 3.63 1.15 4.11 1.36 -.03 .01 -.02 .08 .30*** .46*** - -.50*** .23** 
8. Attitudes towards AA 3.61 1.51 3.74 1.48 .11 -.04 .08 .23** -.38*** -.66*** -.38*** - -.02 
9. Stereotyping 3.55 0.47 3.79 0.57 .21* -.10 .09 .10 .02 .02 .11 -.21** - 
Note: Correlations for race and gender conditions below and above diagonal, respectively. † < .10 * p < .05 ** p <.01 *** p < .001. 
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      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
    M SD                 
1. Condition (Blind vs. Aware) 1.51 0.50 -        
2. Condition (Aware vs. E-Aware) 1.52 0.50 - -       
3. Condition (Blind vs. E-Aware) 1.53 0.50 - - -      
4. Awareness 4.52 1.11 .49*** .01 .47*** -     
5. System Justification 3.87 1.38 -.001 -.02 -.02 .13† -    
6. Denial of Inequality 3.32 1.29 .21* .18* .03 .27*** .52*** -   
7. Biological Essentialism 4.18 1.24 .29** -.17* .12 .52*** .38*** .52*** -  
8. Attitudes towards AA 3.76 1.49 -.21* .20* -.02 -.36*** -.34*** -.67*** -.55*** - 
9. Stereotyping 3.62 0.50 .21* -.06 .15+ .38*** .06 .003 .27*** -.26*** 




Figure 1: Mediation Models for Study 1 
Model 1a: Awareness on System Justification through Denial of Inequality as a Function of 















Figure 2: Scatterplots of Race and Gender Awareness on System Justification in Study 2 
 































Figure 3: Graphs for Race and Gender Ideologies on (A) System Justification, (B) Denial of 
Inequality, and (C) Essentialism in Study 3 
 

















Figure 4: Mediation Models for Study 3 
Model 2a: Ideology on System Justification through Denial of Inequality as a Function of 
























Figure 5: Graphs for Ideologies on (A) System Justification, (B) Denial of Inequality (C) 
Essentialism, (D) Attitudes toward Affirmative Action, and (E) Stereotyping in Study 4 
 




























Figure 6: Mediation Models for Study 4 
Model 3a: Ideology on Attitudes toward Affirmative Action through Denial of Inequality as 







































Figure 7: Graphs for Ideologies on (A) System Justification, (B) Denial of Inequality (C) 
Essentialism, (D) Support for Affirmative Action and (E) Stereotyping in Study 6 
 















(B) Denial of Inequality    (C) Essentialism     
 
(D) Support for Affirmative Action  (D) Stereotyping 
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Figure 8: Forrest Plots for Effects Across Studies 
 
7a: System Justification 
 




7b: Denial of Inequality 
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To what extent do you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. We need to recognize and celebrate the cultural differences between men and women in 
order to create an equal society. 
2. The differences between [men and women] [racial groups] should be acknowledged and 
celebrated. 
3. It is easier for [men and women] [racial groups] to get along if they simply acknowledge they 
approach things differently. 
4. [Men and women have many differences] [there are many differences between racial groups] 
that are important to acknowledge and embrace. 
5. We must appreciate the unique characteristics of [men and women] [different racial groups] 
in order to have a cooperative society. 
6. Talking about differences between [men and women] [racial groups] causes unnecessary 
tension.* 
7. We should try not to notice [or think about when an individual is male or female] [or focus 
on someone's race].* 
8. There is no reason to categorize individuals based on their [gender] [race].* 
9. It is important to pay attention to the individual characteristics that make a person unique 
rather than their [gender] [ethnic  or racial background].* 
10. Focusing on differences between [men and women] [racial groups] undermines social 
cooperation and progress.* 
 
*Indicates blindness items (reversed). 
Note: Items 4 and 9 were not used in Study 2b 
 
System Justification (Kay & Jost, 2003) 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. In general, you find society to be fair.  
2. In general, the American political system operates as it should. 
3. American society needs to be radically restructured.* 
4. The United States is the best country in the world to live in. 
5. Most policies serve the greater good. 
6. Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness. 
7. Our society is getting worse every year.* 
8. Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
 






Denial of Inequality 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree) 
 
A. Modern Prejudice (Swim, Aiken, Hall & Hunter, 1995) 
 
1. Discrimination against [Blacks] [women] is no longer a problem in the United States. 
2. [Black people] [Women] often miss out on good jobs due to [racial] [sexual] discrimination.* 
3. It is rare to see [a black person] [women] treated in a sexist manner on television. 
4. On average, people in our society treat [all people equally, regardless of their racial 
background] [husbands and wives] equally. 
5. Society has reached the point where [all racial groups] [women and men] have equal 
opportunities for achievement. 
6. It is easy to understand the anger of [Black people] [women's groups] in America.* 
7. It is easy to understand why [Black people] [women's groups] are still concerned about 
societal limitations of [their] [women's] opportunities.* 
8. Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern 
about the treatment of [Black people] [women] than is warranted by [their] [women's] actual 
experiences 
 
B. (Denial of) Privilege (Swim & Miller, 1999) 
  
1. [Whites people] [Men] have certain advantages that [minorities] [women] do not have in this 
society.* 
2. [Their status as White people] [Men's status] grants them unearned privileges in today’s 
society.* 
3. I feel that [White skin] [being a male] in the United States opens many doors for [Whites] 
[men] during their everyday lives.* 
4. I do not feel that [White people] [men] have any benefits or privileges due to their [race] 
[sex]. 
5. [Being White] [Men's gender] is not an asset to [White people] [them] in their everyday life. 
 
















Essentialism (Coleman & Hong, 2008) 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. To a large extent, a person’s gender [race] biologically determines his or her abilities and 
traits. 
2. It is hard if not impossible to change the innate dispositions of a person’s gender [race] 
3. When men and women [racial groups] differ in some way, it is likely that the difference is 
due to biological factors. 
4. Gender [race] is more directly linked to biology than to the way a person is socialized. 
5. If social situations change, the characteristics we attribute to gender [race] categories will 
change as well.* 
6. The properties of gender [race] are constructed totally for economic, political, and social 
reasons* 
7. Gender [race] is a result of ‘‘nurture’’ ["culture"] more than ‘‘nature’’* 
8. A person’s gender [race] has more to do with a person’s social environment than with an 
individual’s disposition* 
 
*Indicates socio-constructionist items (reversed) 
 
Attitudes towards Affirmative Action (Jost & Thompson, 2000; and Murrell et al., 1994), 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. Affirmative Action in education gives an opportunity to qualified [Blacks people] [women] 
who might not have had a chance without it. 
2. Affirmative action for [black people] [women] may force employers to hire unqualified 
people.* 
3. Affirmative Action in the workplace for [Blacks people] [women] helps make sure that the 
U.S. work force and economy remain competitive 
4. Because of past discrimination, [Black people] [women] should be given preference in hiring 
and promotion. 
5. Employers, colleges, or social organizations should consider whether an applicant is [Black] 
[a woman] when making selection decision. 
6. To compensate for past discrimination, employers, colleges, or social organizations, should 
make an extra effort to hire a greater number of [Black] [female] applicants. 
 











Stereotyping (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000) 
 
Below is a list of traits. Please indicate the extent to which you think that IN GENERAL each 
trait is characteristic of the AVERAGE [White or Black person] [man or woman]  
• 1= much more characteristic of Whites/men - 5 = much more characteristic of Blacks/women 
 
Gender: 
• Masculine: (1) independent (2) competitive; (3) dominant (4) analytic (5) leader (6) assertive 
• Feminine: (1) sympathetic (2) kind (3) warm (4) gentle (5) nurturing* (6) sensitive* 
• Total Gender: Mean: Masculine Stereotypes and Feminine Stereotypes (reversed) 
 
Race: 
• Cultural Positive: (1) athletic (2) rhythmic (3) religious (4) good at dancing* (5) spiritual* 
• Cultural Negative: (1) poor (2) uneducated (3) threatening (4) aggressive* (5) violent* 
• Total Cultural: Mean: Cultural Positive Stereotypes and Negative Cultural Stereotypes 
 
*Only used in Study 1 
Other Scales (used in Study 1, 3 and 4): 
 
Protestant Work Ethic (Study 1) (Katz & Hass, 1998) 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements. 
2. Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time. 
3. Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely. 
4. Most people who don't succeed in life are just plain lazy. 
5. Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of succeeding. 
6. People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough. 
7. Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer. 
8. The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the person who gets 
ahead 
9. If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for themselves 
10. I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do. 
11. A distaste for hard work usually reflects a weakness of character. 
 
Social Dominance Orientation (4-item; Study 3) (Pratto et al., 2013) 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements (1 = strongly disagree - 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. In setting priorities, we must consider all groups.* 
2. We should not push for group equality. 
3.  Group equality should be our ideal.* 
4. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.  
*Indicates reversed item 
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Symbolic Prejudice (reversed/rescaled according to scoring system; Study 1, 3, 4) (Sears, 1998) 
 
1. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve (1 = 
strongly disagree – 4 = strongly agree) 
2. It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder 
they could be just as well off as whites (1 = strongly disagree – 4 = strongly agree) 
3. Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way 
up. Blacks should do the same (1 = strongly disagree – 4 = strongly agree) 
4. Some say that Black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel like they haven’t 
pushed fast enough. What do you think? (1.33 =going to slowly; 2.66 =moving at right speed; 
4 =moving too fast) 
5. How much of the racial tension that exists in the U.S. today do you think Blacks are 
responsible for creating? (1 = not much at all – 4 = all of it) 
6. How much discrimination against Blacks do you feel there is in the U.S. today, limiting their 
chances to get ahead (1 = a lot – 4 = none at all) 
7. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for  
Blacks to work their way out of the lower class (1 = strongly disagree – 4 = strongly agree)* 
8. Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve (1 = strongly disagree – 4 
= strongly agree)* 
 
*Indicates reversed item 
 
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Studies 1 and 3) (Rollero, Glick & Tartaglia, 2012) 
 
Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in 
contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree. 
• 1 = disagree strongly – 6 = agree strongly 
 
Benevolent Sexism 
• Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess. 
• Women should be cherished and protected by men. 
• Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores. 
• Men are incomplete without women. 
• Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility 
• Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the 
women in their lives. 
 
Hostile Sexism: 
• Women seek to gain power by getting control over men. 
• Women exaggerate problems they have at work. 
• Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash. 
• When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being 
discriminated against. 
• Many women get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and then refusing 
male advances. 
• Feminists are making unreasonable demands of men. 
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Appendix B: Reflections used in Study 3 
 
In the first part of our study, we would like you to reflect on racial issues in society. Social 
scientists have been working to understand how to best approach racial differences to create a 
more harmonious society. On the next page, you will read about one of the ways social scientists 




Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues 
are a #1 concern for the United States. We are in the unique position of having many different 
cultural groups living within our borders. This could potentially be a great asset. Different 
cultural groups bring different perspectives to life, providing a richness in food, dress, music, art, 
styles of interaction, and problem solving strategies. Each ethnic group within the United States 
can contribute in its own unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of 
harmony and complementarity among the various ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents, 
as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we 
validate the identity of each group and we recognize its existence and its importance to the social 
fabric. We can allow each group to utilize its assets, to be aware of its own particular problems 
or difficulties, and overall to live up to its potential. Thus, social scientists argue that 
understanding the differences among ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social 




Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues 
are a #1 concern for the United States. At the present time, we are experiencing a great deal of 
conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed 
our creed in the Declaration of Independence that "all men (and women) are created equal." That 
is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first 
and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United States. In order to 
make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as a collection 
of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin color 
and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger 
group, "Americans." Currently, we are spending a great many resources on conflict between 
ethnic groups. If we can recognize our "sameness" we will be able to re-channel those resources 
to work on difficult and important other problems within our society such technological growth 
and economic development. Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to 




Before beginning this exercise, we would like you to reflect on the current state of race-relations 
in the U.S. We have found that it helps to first reflect on some issues relevant to race interactions 
prior to completing the questionnaire in order to make your views more accessible. Please take a 
couple of seconds to think about your views about the current state of race-relations in the United 




Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that gender inequality 
issues are a #1 concern for the United States. At present, there is more tension between men and 
women. In order to achieve equality, we must acknowledge and embrace the differences between 
men and women. Men and women bring different perspectives to life, providing a richness in 
perspectives, dress, styles of interaction, and problem solving strategies. Both men and women 
can contribute to society in their own unique way. Recognizing these differences would help 
build a sense of harmony and complementarity among the sexes. Both genders have their own 
talents, as well as their own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and 
weaknesses, we validate the identity of women and men and we recognize their contribution to 
the social fabric and functioning of society. We can allow both women and men to utilize their 
assets, to be aware of their own particular problems or difficulties, and overall to live up to their 
potential. Thus, social scientists argue that understanding the differences among men and women 




Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that gender inequality 
issues are a #1 concern for the United States. At present, there is more tension between men and 
women. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed our creed in the Declaration 
of Independence that “all men and women are created equal. We must remember that we are all 
first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United States. In order to 
make the U.S. as and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as men or women, 
but instead as individuals and American citizens. Pretending that men and women approach life 
in fundamentally different ways is counter productive, and focusing on similarities would lead 
men and women to more cooperation, both in the workplace, at home and in their relationships. 
Men and women have much more in common than people believe and if we can recognize our 
“sameness” we will be able to work together on difficult and important problems within our 
society, such as technological growth and economic development. Thus, social scientists 
encourage us to see the larger picture, to appreciate that at our core, men and women really are 




Before beginning this exercise, we would like you to reflect on the current state of gender 
relations in the U.S. We have found that it helps to first reflect on some issues relevant to gender 
interactions prior to completing the questionnaire in order to make your views more accessible. 
Please take a couple of seconds to think about your views about the current state of gender-













Embracing Differences is Key to Equality, New Research Suggests 
 
Research from many disciplines, from sociology, psychology, economics, and political science – 
all agree that interethnic issues are a growing concern for the U.S. and note that, to achieve 
equality, it is important to embrace our differences, rather than denying them. According to this 
perspective, we will be in a better position to advance as a society if we embrace that different 
cultural groups bring different backgrounds to life, providing richness in viewpoints, styles of 
interaction, experiences, and problem solving strategies. Each ethnic group within the U.S. can 
contribute in its own unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of 
harmony and complementarity among the various ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents, 
as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we 
validate the identity of each group.  
 
New research suggests that modern American society would be better off if people would 
recognize that different ethnic groups have their own strengths and weaknesses, experiences, and 
issues. Acknowledging this diversity would help build a sense of harmony, consciousness, and 
complementarity among ethnic groups. In a recent interview, professor James North noted 
“while there is great variety within each ethnic group,” he says, “there are indisputable 
differences between them — recognizing these creates a better understanding of each group.”  
 
“The notion of ‘race’ is important to recognize,” notes Mary Fine a second author on the paper. 
Fine points out that these differences could be due to a variety of reasons, from experience, to 
biology to culture, to socialization. According to Fine, where the differences come from is 
unimportant. “Regardless, the differences exist and to deny that is simply like sticking our heads 
in the sand.” 
 
Fine believes that ethnic groups would be more successful and satisfied with their lives and 
interact more cooperatively if they embraced the idea that there are differences that are important 
to acknowledge. According to Fine, “understanding and utilizing our differences would not only 
contribute to a more cooperative and efficient workplace, but could also help interpersonal 
relationships between different ethnic groups.” Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the 















Minimizing Differences is Key to Equality, New Research Suggests 
 
Research from many disciplines, from sociology, psychology, economics, and political science – 
all agree that interethnic issues are a growing concern for the U.S. and note that, to achieve 
equality, it is important to heed our creed in the Declaration of Independence that "all men (and 
women) are created equal." According to this perspective, we will be in a better position to 
advance as a society if we remember that we are all, first and foremost human beings, and 
second, American citizens. Instead of thinking that we are all different because of our ethnic 
backgrounds, we should instead see each person as an individual.  
 
New research suggests that modern American society would be better off if people would 
recognize that different ethnic groups are much more similar than they are different. 
Acknowledging this similarity would help build a sense of harmony and unity among different 
ethnic groups. In a recent interview, professor James North noted, “that is really the story here – 
The most striking thing about different ethnic groups is how much they have in common. There 
is simply so much overlap between different groups. The most important thing is to pay attention 
to the characteristics that make a person a unique individual rather than focusing on his or her 
ethnicity”.  
 
“The notion of ‘race’ is really just a historical artifact. Human groups are much more alike than 
they are different”, notes Mary Fine, a second author on the paper. Similarities may be due to the 
largely identical biological make-up that all humans share or they may be shaped and molded 
through our culture. According to Fine, where the similarities come from is unimportant. 
“Pretending ethnic groups are fundamentally different is counterproductive to society,” says 
Fine.  
 
Fine believes that ethnic groups would be more successful, satisfied with their lives, and interact 
more cooperatively, if they embraced the idea that they both approach situations and problems in 
much the same way. According to Fine, “understanding and focusing upon individual 
differences, not group differences, would not only contribute to a more cooperative and creative 
workplace, but could also help interpersonal relationships between different ethnic groups.” 
Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, and to appreciate that at our core, 
















Embracing Differences is Key to Equality, New Research Suggests 
 
Research from many disciplines, from sociology, psychology, economics, and political science – 
all agree that gender issues are a growing concern for the U.S. and social scientists note that to 
achieve equality it is important to embrace our differences, rather than denying them. According 
to this perspective, we will be in a better position to advance as a society if we embrace that men 
and women bring different perspectives to life, providing a richness in viewpoints, styles of 
interaction, experiences, and problem solving strategies. Each gender can contribute in its own 
unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and 
complementarity among men and women. Men and women have their own talents, as well as 
their own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the 
identity of each gender.  
 
New research suggests that modern American society would be better off if people would 
recognize that men and women have their own strengths and weaknesses, experiences and issues. 
Acknowledging this diversity would help build a sense of harmony, consciousness, and 
complementarity among men and women. In a recent interview, professor James North noted 
“while there is great variety within men and within group women,” he says, “there are 
indisputable differences—recognizing these differences creates a better understanding of men 
and women”.  
 
“The notion of ‘gender’ is important to recognize,” says Mary Fine a second author on the paper. 
Fine points out that these differences could be due to a variety of reasons, from culture, to 
biology, to experience, to socialization. According to Fine, where the differences come from is 
unimportant. “Regardless, the differences exist and to deny that is simply like sticking our heads 
in the sand.”  
 
Fine believes that men and women would be more successful and satisfied with their lives and 
interact more cooperatively if they embraced the idea that there are differences that are important 
to acknowledge. According to Fine, “understanding and utilizing our differences would not only 
contribute to a more cooperative and efficient workplace, but could also help interpersonal 
relationships between men and women.” Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the larger 
















Minimizing Differences is Key to Equality, New Research Suggests 
 
Research from many disciplines, from sociology, psychology, economics, and political science – 
all agree that gender issues are a growing concern for the U.S. and social scientists note that, to 
achieve equality, it is important to heed our creed in the Declaration of Independence that "all 
men and women are created equal." According to this perspective, we will be in a better position 
to advance as a society if we remember that we are all, first and foremost human beings, and 
second, American citizens. Instead of thinking that we are all different because of our gender, we 
should instead see each person as an individual.  
 
New research suggests that modern American society would be better off if people would 
recognize that women and men are much more similar than they are different. Acknowledging 
this similarity would help build a sense of harmony and unity among men and women. In a 
recent interview, professor, James North noted, “that is really the story here – the most striking 
thing about men and women is how much they have in common. There is simply so much 
overlap between the two groups. The most important thing is to pay attention to the 
characteristics that make a person a unique individual rather than focusing on his or her gender.”  
 
The notion of ‘gender’ is really just a historical artifact,” notes Mary Fine, a second author on the 
paper. “Men and women are much more alike than they are different.” Fine points out that these 
similarities may be due to the largely identical biological make-up that all humans share, or they 
may be shaped and molded through our culture. According to Fine, where the similarities come 
from is unimportant. “Pretending men and women are fundamentally different is 
counterproductive to society,” says Fine.  
 
Fine believes that men and women would be more successful, more satisfied with their lives, and 
interact more cooperatively both in the workplace and at home if people embraced the idea that 
the genders typically approach situations and problems in much the same way. According to 
Fine, ‘understanding and focusing upon individual differences, not group differences, would not 
only contribute to a more cooperative and creative workplace, but could also help in 
interpersonal relationships between men and women.” Thus, social scientists encourage us to see 

















Big Data Is the Future, New Research Suggests 
 
Research from many disciplines, from sociology, finance, economics, and behavioral science – 
all agree that big data is a growing source of information field for decision and policy-making. 
These scientists note that it is important to use this data to our advantage for the U.S. to remain a 
strong and growing economy, as it allows us to capture important and diverse information from 
millions of people. According to this perspective, we will be in a better position to advance as a 
society if we can leverage data from healthcare, to advertising, to safety, to understand human 
behavior and decision-making.  
 
Big data allows us to understand both the similar and different perspectives that people bring to 
life, providing an understanding of the ways in which people differ and agree on a number of 
viewpoints and perspectives. Though such data includes millions of data-points, it allows each 
individual to contribute to policies, research, and decision making in their own way. Though 
there each individual is represented, there are overwhelming similarities and overarching patterns 
between many people online. This could help bring an understanding of the opinions amongst 
people that would contribute to policies and decisions that affect us all.  
 
New research shows in a number of simulations that collecting data from millions of blog and 
Facebook posts, comments on news articles, and discussions on forums, we can match census 
data survey on opinions and beliefs. In a recent interview, professor James North noted “while 
traditional ways of making inferences have been useful for understanding human behavior, big 
data provides a new opportunity for decision making – especially in areas where people are 
reluctant to express opinions candidly.” He says, “there are indisputable benefits to collecting 
data using traditional methods, like census data and opinion surveys — but recognizing the 
potential accuracy of big-data collection can help supplement these methods to provide new 
ways of decision-making.”  
 
“These notions are important to recognize,” says Mary Fine a second author on the paper. Fine 
points out that this data matched surveyed opinions almost exactly and took far less time to 
collect than traditional methods. According to Fine, ignoring the potential utility of big data in 
policy-making is counterproductive to society and is simply like “sticking our heads in the sand.” 
According to Fine, “Many other economies have already adopted this approach, so 
understanding the potential of this information would not only contribute to a more efficient 
society but it could help inform policy decisions that affect everyone, such as political and 
healthcare policies.” She encourages us to see the larger picture, and to appreciate that big data is 










Appendix D: Email Excerpt  
 
Subject: [Institution] Reflects Survey. Make your voice heard! 
 
The [Institution] Reflects Survey measures diversity, equity, and inclusiveness in our 
community.  
  
[Institution] Reflects seeks to promote diversity, equity and inclusion within the Business School 
community. We strive to continuously understand and improve the student experience at [our 
institution] with the goal of ensuring that all students can thrive academically, socially, and in 
their career pursuits, both while at [the institution] and after graduation. 
  
This is the only student-to-student, no-frills survey that’s focused on diversity, equity, and 
inclusion here at [our institution]. Results will be used to address key issues, and determine 
actionable plans to improve and evolve the student experience. 
  
Join us for several events focused on diversity and inclusion in our community. We will discuss 































Appendix E: Experience Awareness Articles used in Studies 6 and 7 
 
Race Experience Awareness 
 
Embracing Differences is Key to Equality, New Research Suggests 
 
Research from many disciplines, from sociology, psychology, economics, and political science – 
all agree that interethnic issues are a growing concern for the U.S. and note, that to achieve 
equality, it is important to embrace our differences, rather than denying them. According to this 
perspective, we will be in a better position to advance as a society if we embrace that different 
cultural groups have important differences in terms of their life-experiences and opportunities. 
Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and complementarity among the 
various ethnic groups. Each group has its own obstacles and experiences that differentially affect 
their lives, and by acknowledging these differences, we validate the identity of each group.  
 
New research suggests that modern American society would be better off if people would 
recognize that ethnic groups differ in a number of respects. In a recent interview, professor, 
James North noted, “While there is great variety within ethnic groups,” he says, “there are 
indisputable differences—recognizing these differences in terms of their life experiences, 
opportunities, and obstacles, can benefit both groups. The ways in which people are treated and 
their opportunities play an important role in their lives. In terms of these experiences, there are 
differences that are important to recognize.” In fact, a recent PEW survey measured self-reported 
life-circumstances and experiences between ethnic groups and found statistically significant 
differences between them. “These differences are important to recognize as they affect important 
outcomes, such as quality of life and economic potential. By acknowledging these differences, 
we create a better understanding of each racial group, recognizing their needs and validating 
their identities,” said North. 
 
“The notion of ‘race’ is important to recognize” says Mary Fine, a second author on the paper. 
Fine points out that differences are likely affected by many factors, but the different experiences 
and treatment each group faces should not be ignored; however, more research is needed to 
better understand the source and consequences of these differences. She notes that, “the 
differences exist and to deny that is simply like sticking our heads in the sand.” 
 
Fine believes that ethnic groups would be more successful and satisfied with their lives and 
interact more cooperatively if they embraced the idea that there are differences that are important 
to acknowledge. According to Fine, “understanding and utilizing our differences would not only 
contribute to a more cooperative and efficient workplace, but could also help interpersonal 
relationships between different ethnic groups.” Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the 









Gender Experience Awareness 
 
Embracing Differences is Key to Equality, New Research Suggests 
 
Research from many disciplines, from sociology, psychology, economics, and political science – 
all agree that gender issues are a growing concern for the U.S. and note, that to achieve equality, 
it is important to embrace our differences, rather than denying them. According to this 
perspective, we will be in a better position to advance as a society if we embrace that men and 
women have important differences in terms of their life-experiences and opportunities. 
Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and complementarity among 
men and women. Each group has its own obstacles and experiences that differentially affect their 
lives, and by acknowledging these differences, we validate the identity of each group.  
 
New research suggests that modern American society would be better off if people would 
recognize that men and women differ in a number of respects. In a recent interview, professor, 
James North noted, “While there is great variety within gender,” he says, “there are indisputable 
differences—recognizing these differences in terms of their life experiences, opportunities, and 
obstacles, can benefit both groups. The ways in which people are treated and their opportunities 
play an important role in their lives. In terms of these experiences, there are differences that are 
important to recognize.” In fact, a recent PEW survey measured self-reported life-circumstances 
and experiences between men and women and found statistically significant differences between 
them. “This difference is important to recognize as it affects important outcomes, such as quality 
of life and economic potential. By acknowledging these differences, we create a better 
understanding of each gender, recognizing their needs and validating their identities,” said North.  
 
“The notion of ‘gender’ is important to recognize” says Mary Fine, a second author on the paper. 
Fine points out that differences are likely affected by many factors, but the different experiences 
and treatment each group faces should not be ignored; however, more research is needed to 
better understand the source and consequences of these differences. She notes that, “the 
differences exist and to deny that is simply like sticking our heads in the sand.” 
 
Fine believes that men and women would be more successful and satisfied with their lives and 
interact more cooperatively if they embraced the idea that there are differences that are important 
to acknowledge. According to Fine, “understanding and utilizing our differences would not only 
contribute to a more cooperative and efficient workplace, but could also help interpersonal 
relationships between different men and women.” Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the 
larger picture, and to appreciate that at our core, we really are all different.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
